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I. INTRODUCTION

Class action litigation has grown exponentially in recent years.' According
to some reports the number of class actions filed in all federal courts increased
by 338 percent between 1988 and 1998, and rose by 1,042 percent in all state
courts during the same period.2 Furthermore, there is no sign that the recent
growth in class action litigation will slow significantly in the near future.

* Partner, Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, Kansas City, Missouri. J.D., University of
Kansas. This Article sometimes uses the masculine pronoun "he" for simplicity's sake;
it does not evidence gender bias. The opinions expressed here are the author's alone.
1. See Michael J. Steiner & Kurt B. Opsahl, Attorney Communicationsin Class
Action Litigation, 115 BANKING L.J. 430, 430 (1998) ("Class action lawsuits have
proliferated in the last few years, especially in the consumer finance and consumer
computer industries."); see also Richard L. Stone & Poopak Nourafchan, Use of Class
Actions Is on the Rise: Key to Class Certification in Antitrust Cases Is Establishing
"Impact"or"FactDamage" Through Common Proof,NAT'LL.J., Mar. 24,2003, at B7
("Today, virtually any case can be filed as a putative class action. Because of massaction consumer statutes, it has become easier for plaintiffs to satisfy the standing
requirement to bring representative suits.").
2. The Federalist Soc'y for Law & Pub. Policy Studies, Analysis: Class Action
Litigation-A FederalistSociety Survey, 1 CLASS ACTION WATCH (2002), availableat
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/classactionwatch/volume 1issue 1.htm.
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It is easy to understand why class actions have proliferated; most involve
claims that individually would not justify the cost of litigation, but that in the
aggregate can generate substantial settlements or damage awards, and
astronomical fees for plaintiffs' counsel? Even class actions of questionable
merit can be prosecuted relatively inexpensively.' As a result, entrepreneurial
plaintiffs' lawyers have repeatedly assembled classes of plaintiffs to sue many
businesses in a variety of industries.5
For most businesses-if not all-class action litigation is a high stakes
challenge. A business sued in a class action often finds its reputation as well as
a great deal of money on the line. Businesses are understandably concerned
when their customers report receiving correspondence from counsel for a
putative class of plaintiffs that allege misconduct by the target company or that
allude to the financial benefits that potential class members are sure to gain as
a result of the related litigation.6 They become even more concerned when their
employees are putative class members, and perhaps managers and supervisors
are the intended targets of communications by plaintiffs' counsel. Yet plaintiffs'
counsel have many ostensibly legitimate reasons to communicate with potential
class members. They may want to survey potential class members' interest in
joining a class action, interview absent class members about potential claims or
grievances relevant to the action, or educate potential class members about their
rights or the potential for relief.7 In cases in which the court does not promptly
resolve class certification issues, plaintiffs' counsel may want to communicate
with putative class members simply to keep them apprised of the status of the
litigation.8

3. See Meachum v. Outdoor World Corp., 654 N.Y.S.2d 240, 252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1996) ("It has been recognized that legal fees have been a prime motivation for the filing
of class actions. Inmost cases, the financial benefit to counsel far exceeds the individual
benefit to class members.") (internal citations omitted).
4. See, e.g., Jennifer Mann & Dan Margolies, Unclassy Actions: Dubious Tactics
CharacterizeMany Lawsuits, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 25, 2003, at D1, D32 (stating that
a "tactic used by some law firms is to ride on the coattails of another law firm's work

product, waiting until a lawsuit has been filed and then putting out a news release
suggesting shareholders contact them," and otherwise describing how some class action

plaintiffs' firms drum up class representatives and plagiarize other lawyers' work
product).
5. See Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: The Need for a HardSecond Look, in
CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT NO. 4, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.manhattan-

institute.org/html/cjr_4.htm.
6. Steiner & Opsahl, supra note 1, at 430.

7. See Linda S. Mullenix, Making Contact,NAT'L L.J., July 23, 2001, at B11.
8. 3 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALMA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15.12,

at 15-38 (3d ed. 1992).
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A defendant may need or wish to communicate with potential class
members who are its customers or employees in contexts related to allegations
or claims made in a pending class action.9 Such communications may have the
effect of dissuading some potential plaintiffs from suing or joining in a lawsuit.
Defense counsel may also want to communicate with potential class members in
an attempt to gather information intended for use in opposing class certification.
Defense counsel may want to survey potential class members to determine their
interest in pursuing relief, or to attempt to persuade them of the defendant's view
of the allegations being made against it.' 0 After a class action lawsuit is filed but
before a class is certified, a defendant may want to communicate with putative
class members to settle individual claims, to persuade them to opt out of the
class, or to otherwise compromise their claims." In a rare case, a defendant may
even attempt to gain some litigation advantage by communicating with class
members after a class is certified.' 2 Not surprisingly, class action plaintiffs'
lawyers are threatened by, resist
and condemn class communication efforts by
3
defendants or their counsel.'
Most lawyers believe that they understand their ethical obligations when it
comes to ex parte communications in litigation. These obligations are not so
clear, however, in class actions. To the extent lawyers sometimes think that their
obligations are clear or their actions immune to serious challenge, they are often
mistaken.' 4
Communications issues become clouded from defense attorneys'
perspective because of uncertainties about the existence of an attorney-client
relationship between class counsel and putative class members, and are further

9. See, e.g., Payne v. Goodyear Tire &Rubber Co., 207 F.R.D. 16 (D.Mass. 2002)
(rejecting plaintiffs' challenge to statements on defendants' web page concerning hose
used in floor heating systems and free inspections of potential class members' homes
containing such systems by defendants' consultant); Lewis v. Bayer, A.G., No. 2353
AUG.TERM 2001, 2002 WL 1472339 (Pa. C.P. June 12, 2002) (holding in Baycol
litigation that defendant's communications with putative class members to obtain
information for reports mandated by the FDA were proper).
10. See Mullenix, supranote 7, at BI 1.
11.

NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS: A PRACTICAL

LITIGATION GUIDE § 5.3.1, at 70-71 (4th ed. 1999).
12. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 212 F.R.D. 14, 17-24 (D.D.C. 2002) (restricting
defendants' communications with members of certified class and referring defense
counsel to disciplinary authorities; defendants sent written communication to class
members that purported to extinguish their rights to a full and accurate accounting of

potential benefits).
13. See CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 11, § 5.3.1, at 71.
14. See, e.g., Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193 (11 th Cir. 1985) (affirming
district court decision disqualifying and fining defense lawyer who wrongly believed

after reading Supreme Court case on class communications that the defendant could
secretly solicit exclusion requests from potential members of a plaintiff class).
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complicated by timing issues peculiar to class action litigation."5 From the
perspective of plaintiffs' counsel, the suggestion that there are limits on their
communications with potential class members may initially appear to be
absurd.1 6 In fact, the limitations that courts may place on plaintiffs' counsel are
well-reasoned.
The subject of ex parte communications with class members is a murky one.
Here the rules of civil procedure and professional responsibility overlap as in no
other area, 7 and case law is relatively scarce. Insofar as class actions are
litigated in federal courts, another problem is that many of the decisions on this
subject are district court decisions, which lack precedential force. 8 In sum,
lawyers' need for guidance in this area is significant and seems destined to grow
in importance as class action litigation continues to expand.
II. THE RULES
The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional
Conduct 9 govern lawyers' conduct in the vast majority of jurisdictions. Rule
4.2, which addresses lawyers' communications with persons represented by
counsel, provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court
order.20
Rule 4.2 is intended to prevent lawyers from taking advantage of laypersons
through undisclosed communications. 2' Rule 4.2 also serves to preserve the

15. See Steiner & Opsahl, supra note 1, at 430-31.
16. Linda S. Mullenix, Class Communications, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 15, 2001, at B 11.

17. Of course, "the abuse or misuse of any rule of civil procedure is a violation of
the spirit of the rules of professional ethics on the most basic level." Blanchard v.
EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 293, 304 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (discussing FED. R. CIV. P.
23).

18. See FutureSource LLC v. Reuters Ltd., 312 F.3d 281, 283 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The
reasoning of district judges is of course entitled to respect, but the decision of a district
judge cannot be a controlling precedent. The law's coherence could not be maintained
if district courts were deemed to make law for their circuit, let alone for the nation, since
district courts do not have circuit-wide or nationwide jurisdiction.") (internal citations

omitted).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003).

20. Id. R. 4.2.
21. Sanifill of Ga., Inc. v. Roberts, 502 S.E.2d 343, 344 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); In
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positions of the parties in an adversarial proceeding and to prevent the disruption
of the attorney-client relationship.22 Finally, the rule generally promotes ethical
behavior by lawyers.2"
To determine whether Rule 4.2 applies or has been violated it is first
important to ascertain if the person with whom communication is desired is in
fact represented by another lawyer in the matter. The existence of an attorneyclient relationship is a question of fact.24 Whether an attorney-client relationship
exists does not necessarily depend on an express agreement; the relationship may
be implied from the parties' conduct.25 The key factor in detennining whether
an attorney-client relationship exists typically is the rendering of legal advice by
the attorney.26 A person may communicate with an attorney in connection with

re Uttermohlen, 768 N.E.2d 449,451 (Ind.2002); State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457,46263 (Minn. 1999) (quoting cases); Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 34 P.3d 194, 201 (Utah
2001) (quoting Wright by Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 567 (Wash.
1984)).
22. Humco, Inc. v. Noble, 31 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Ky. 2000); see also In re Baker,
758 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ind.2001) (noting that one purpose of Rule 4.2 is to preserve "the
integrity of the lawyer-client relationship").
23. Sanifill, 502 S.E.2d at 344.
24. In re Bernstein, 707 A.2d 371, 375 (D.C. 1998); Stender v. Vincent, 992 P.2d
50, 58 (Haw. 2000); Warner v. Stewart, 930 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Idaho 1997); Bd. of
Overseers of the Bar v. Mangan, 763 A.2d 1189, 1192-93 (Me. 2001); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Shaw, 732 A.2d 876, 883 (Md. 1999); Gramling v. Mem' Blood
Ctrs., 601 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); In re Disciplinary Action Against
McKechnie, 656 N.W.2d 661,667 (N.D. 2003); DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc.,
755 A.2d 757, 766 (R.I. 2000); Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 767
(S.D. 2002); State ex rel. DeFrances v. Bedell, 446 S.E.2d 906, 910 (W. Va. 1994);
Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 513-14 (Wyo. 1995).
25. Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 595-96 (Ariz.
2001); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Brooke, 821 A.2d 414, 424 (Md. 2003);
McKechnie, 656 N.W.2d at 667; In re Wyllie, 19 P.3d 338, 344 (Or. 2001).
26. See Marx v. Benzel, 66 P.3d 735, 736 (Alaska 2003) (quoting Griffen v. E.
Prairie Sch. Dist., 945 F. Supp. 1251, 1254 (E.D. Mo. 1996)); Associated Wholesale
Grocers, Inc. v. Americold Corp., 975 P.2d 231,236 (Kan. 1999) (quoting In re Adoption
of Irons, 684 P.2d 332 (Kan. 1984), and citing Prof I Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Kimbrell, 758
F. Supp. 676, 682 (D. Kan. 1991)); Macomb County Taxpayers Ass'n v. L'Anse Creuse
Pub. Schs., 564 N.W.2d 457,462 (Mich. 1997) ("The rendering of legal advice and legal
services by the attorney and the client's reliance on that advice or those services is the
benchmark of an attorney-client relationship."); Pine Island Farmers Coop. v. Erstad &
Riemer, P.A., 649 N.W.2d 444,448 (Minn. 2002) ("Under tort theory, an attorney-client

relationship is created when a person seeks and receives legal advice from an attorney in
circumstances in which a reasonable person would rely on the advice."); Richardson v.
Griffiths, 560 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Neb. 1997) ("An attorney-client relationship is created
when a person seeks advice or assistance from an attorney, the advice or assistance

sought pertains to matters within the attorney's professional competence, and the attorney
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a matter, but that does not necessarily mean that the person is being represented
by the attorney.27
In a class action, however, the creation and existence of an attorney-client
relationship on the plaintiffs' side may stray from these basic tenets. While the
existence of an attorney-client relationship between class counsel and the
representative plaintiffs can be analyzed under traditional principles, 8 that is not
true with respect to putative class members. Certainly, the mere filing of the
lawsuit to be prosecuted as a class action does not create an attorney-client
relationship between plaintiffs' counsel and putative class members.29 Instead,
the attorney-client relationship between class counsel and putative class members
"is one of court creation," 30 necessitated by the representative nature of the
litigation.3 ' The relationship is created when the court decides that the case may
proceed as a class action, referred to as "certifying" the class.32
From plaintiffs' counsel's perspective, it is most important to understand
how Rule 4.2 applies to organizational litigants,33 as class action defendants
often are business organizations.34 "Because an organization functions only

expressly or impliedly agrees to give or actually gives the desired advice or assistance.");
Todd v. State, 931 P.2d 721,724-25 (Nev. 1997) (quoting DeVaux v. Am. Home Assur.
Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Mass. 1983)); Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 1068, 1076
(Wash. 2002) ("The essence of the attorney/client relationship is whether the attorney's
advice or assistance is sought and received on legal matters.") (quoting Bohn v. Cody,
832 P.2d 71, 75 (Wash. 1992)).
27. See Humco, 31 S.W.3d at 919.
28. See In re Chicago Flood Litig., 682 N.E.2d 421, 425 (III. App. Ct. 1997)
(noting that an attorney-client relationship generally is a "voluntary, contractual
relationship" and that the relationship "between the class representative plaintiff and class
counsel is one of private contract").
29. See Gillespie v. Scherr, 987 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Tex. App. 1999).
30. Chicago FloodLitig., 682 N.E.2d at 425.
31. See id. ("[Tihe class action permits a representative party, a lawyer, and a court
to initiate a mass action on behalf of similarly situated class members without their
consent. In certifying a class action, the court confers the status of litigant upon class
plaintiffs and creates an attorney-client relationship between those plaintiffs and a court-

designated lawyer.").
32. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
33.
An organizational litigant may be a corporation, partnership, sole
proprietorship, or not-for-profit entity. State ex rel. Pitts v. Roberts, 857 S.W.2d 200,
201 n.2 (Mo. 1993).
34. Not all class action defendants are organizations, of course; individuals also
may be sued in class actions. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Eden, 209 F.R.D. 460 (D. Kan. 2002)
(suing corporate officers in a class action under ERISA). When the defendants are
individuals, however, the Rule 4.2 analysis is much easier from plaintiffs' counsel's
perspective. See Holdren v. Gen. Motors Corp., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1194 (D. Kan.
1998) ("In those cases in which the parties are individuals, [Rule 4.2] is easily applied.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss4/2
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through its people, the question is which people affiliated in some way with the
organization occupy a status or play a role sufficient to take on the attributes of
the party itself."35 This can be a complicated inquiry.36
Most courts have rejected view that Rule 4.2 prevents an attorney from
communicating with all employees of a represented organization. 7 Courts have
typically looked to the comments to Rule 4.2 for guidance when trying to decide
which employees are off limits. For years the commentary to the rule provided:
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications by
a lawyer for another person or entity concerning the matter in
representation with persons having a [1] managerial responsibility on
behalf of the organization, and [2] with any other person whose act or
omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or [3] whose
statement may constitute an admission on the part of the
organization."
The 2003 version of Rule 4.2 takes a different approach. The commentary
to the new version of Rule 4.2 provides in pertinent part:
In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits
communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises,
directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning
the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to
the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may
be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal
39
liability.

When one or more parties is a corporation or other organization, however, an application
of Rule 4.2 becomes more difficult."); In re Air Crash Disaster, 909 F. Supp. 1116, 1121
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (observing that "where the parties are individuals, Rule 4.2 is easily
enforced because it is easy to identifythe 'represented parties' protected," and contrasting
that to a case with a corporate defendant, where "it is more difficult to delineate the
parameters and scope of the protected class").
35. Holdren, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1194.
36. See Sanifill of Ga., Inc. v. Roberts, 502 S.E.2d 343, 344 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998);
Messing, Rudavsky & Welicky, P.C. v. President of Harvard Coll., 764 N.E.2d 825, 830
(Mass. 2002).
37. Messing, 764 N.E.2d at 830.
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 4 (200 1); see also Sanifill, 502
S.E.2d at 344; Humco, Inc. v. Noble, 31 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Ky. 2000); State ex rel. Pins
v. Roberts, 857 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo. 1993).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2003).
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At least one court has considered this new comment an inappropriate test.4 °
A few jurisdictions have departed from Rule 4.2 and its commentary to craft
their own approach to ex parte communications with employees of
organizational parties. These courts have adopted the so-called "managingspeaking agent test."'4' Under this test, communication is prohibited with those
employees who have "'speaking authority' for the corporation who 'have
sufficient to give them the right to speak for, and bind, the
managing authority
42
corporation."

Among the most hotly contested issues surrounding Rule 4.2 is whether the
rule prohibits ex parte communications with an organizational litigant'sformer
employees. It is now well-settled that Rule 4.2 generally does not bar ex parte
communications with former employees.4 3 This freedom does have some limits,
however. An attorney cannot communicate ex parte with former employees who
have their own counsel in a matter." Some jurisdictions prohibit ex parte
communications with former employees who had managerial responsibility in the
matter being litigated,45 who have an on-going relationship with the organization

40. Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assocs., Ltd., 59 P.3d 1237, 1248 (Nev. 2002).
41. See, e.g., Messing, 764 N.E.2d at 833; Palmer, 59 P.3d at 1247-48.
42. Messing, 764 N.E.2d at 833 (quoting Wright by Wright v. Group Health Hosp.,

691 P.2d 564, 569 (Wash. 1984)).
43. See, e.g., Lang v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992);
Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 858-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)
(discussing California counterpart to Rule 4.2); DiOssi v. Edison, 583 A.2d 1343, 1345
(Del. Super. Ct. 1990); H.B.A. Mgrnt., Inc. v. Estate of Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541,544-46
(Fla. 1997); Sanifll, 502 S.E.2d at 345 ("This interpretation has been adopted by a

majority of the courts which have considered the issue."); P.T. Barnum's Nightclub v.
Duhamell, 766 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("We join with the majority of
jurisdictions that have analyzed this issue and hold that Indiana's Rule 4.2 does not

prohibit an attorney from contacting the former employee of a party adverse to the
attorney's client in litigation."); Humco, 31 S.W.3d at 920 (observing that this approach
"has been adopted by the majority" of jurisdictions); Schmidt v. Gregorio, 705 So. 2d
742, 743-44 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Patriarca v. Ctr. for Living & Working, Inc., 778
N.E.2d 877, 881-82 (Mass. 2002); Smith v. Kan. City S. Ry., 87 S.W.3d 266, 274 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2002) ("We agree with the overwhelming majority of other states that [Rule 4.2]
simply does not apply to former employees who are not expressly represented by their
own counsel or counsel for the organization."); Neil S. Sullivan Assocs., Ltd. v. Medco
Containment Servs., Inc., 607 A.2d 1386, 1390 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992); Fulton
v. Lane, 829 P.2d 959, 960 (Okla. 1992); State ex rel. Charleston Area Med. Ctr. v.
Zakaib, 437 S.E.2d 759, 763-64 (W. Va. 1993) ("There is little question that a majority
of jurisdictions that have had occasion to consider whether Rule 4.2 restrictions are
applicable to former employees have concluded that they are not applicable."); Strawser
v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 843 P.2d 613, 622 (Wyo. 1992).
44. See Smith, 87 S.W.3d at 274; CharlestonArea Med. Ctr., 437 S.E.2d at 762.
45. Patriarca,778 N.E.2d at 882.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss4/2
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in connection with the litigation," or whose acts or omissions gave rise to the
litigation.47 Other courts hold that Rule 4.2 prohibits attorneys from asking
former employees about privileged information.4"
Several additional points about Rule 4.2 bear mention. First, the rule does

not protect a party's right to counsel; it protects counsel's right to be present
during any communication between his client and opposing counsel.4 The right
to invoke Rule 4.2 thus belongs to the attorney; only the attorney can approve ex
parte communications with his client or waive the right to be present during
communications between his client and an opposing attorney-the client cannot
consent to ex parte contact.5" Second, a lawyer cannot circumvent the rule by
directing another person to communicate with a represented party."' Third, Rule
4.2 applies even where the represented person initiates the communication.5 2 In
that circumstance the lawyer must immediately terminate the communication as
soon as the lawyer learns that communication with the person is improper.53
Fourth, Rule 4.2 "protects parties from contacts that are well meaning but
misguided as well as those that are intentionally improper."5 4 Thus, an attorney
may violate Rule 4.2 through ex parte communications made innocently or
negligently. 5 The fact that an improper ex parte communication was inadvertent

46. Lang, 826 P.2d at 1233; see also Humco, 31 S.W.3d at 920 ("A former
employee with no present relationshipwith the organizational party is not a 'party' under
[Rule 4.2], and thus the individual is not adverse in the sense that his interests are at stake
in the litigation.") (emphasis added).
47. Lang, 826 P.2d at 1233.
48. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 695, 697 (W.D. La.
1997); Neil S. Sullivan Assocs., 607 A.2d at 1390.
49. State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Minn. 1999).
50. United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461-62 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing local
federal court equivalent of Rule 4.2); Blanchard v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 293,
301-02 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Faison v. Thornton, 863 F. Supp. 1204, 1213 (D. Nev. 1993)
(discussing Nevada counterpart to Model Rule 4.2); Miller, 600 N.W.2d at 464.
51. See, e.g., In re Complaint of PMD Enters., Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 519, 529
(D.N.J. 2002) (revoking pro hac vice admission of lawyer who attempted to circumvent
Rule 4.2 through investigator); Holdren v. Gen. Motors Corp., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1193
(D. Kan. 1998) (granting defendant's motion for protective order where plaintiff's lawyer
instructed client to obtain affidavits from co-workers).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 3 (2003).

53. Id.
54. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kent, 653 A.2d 909, 918 (Md. 1995).
55. Faison v. Thornton, 863 F. Supp. 1204, 1213 (D. Nev. 1993) (discussing
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 182, which is nearly identical to Model Rule 4.2); see, e.g.,
In re Capper, 757 N.E.2d 138, 139-40 (Ind. 2001) (holding that lawyer who
communicated with represented adverse party based on client's statement that adversary
was no longer represented by counsel without confirming the truth of that assertion
violated Rules 4.2 and 8.4(d)).
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rather than intentional bears only on the remedy selected or sanction imposed;
it does not negate the violation.56 Finally, a lawyer who violates Rule 4.2 may
also violate other ethics rules. Chief among these is Rule 8.4(d),57 which
provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer "to engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice."'
A few jurisdictions have not adopted the Model Rules, preferring continued
adherence to the predecessor Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 9 The
Model Code deals with ex parte communications in DR 7-104(A)(1), which
provides that during the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
"[c]ommunicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter
unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is
authorized by law to do so."6 °
Like Rule 4.2, DR 7-104(A)(1) is intended to prevent situations in which
a represented party may be taken advantage of by opposing counsel and to
preserve the proper functioning of the adversary system.6 Although DR 7104(A)(1) refers to communications with a "party" rather than a "person," the
rule is not limited to plaintiffs or defendants in a lawsuit; rather, it prohibits
nonconsensual ex parte communications with any represented person. 62 And,
like Rule 4.2, the right to invoke DR 7-104(A)(1) is the lawyer's alone. Thus,
the rule is not waived simply because the represented person consents to or
initiates the communication.63 Finally, as with Rule 4.2, a lawyer cannot
circumvent DR 7-104(A)(1) by directing another person to make a
communication that the lawyer would be prohibited from making."
Regardless of whether communications are judged under Rule 4.2 or DR
7-104(A)(1), lawyers handling class actions receive scant guidance. Neither rule

56. United States v. Franklin, 177 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466 (E.D. Va. 2001); Faison,
863 F.Supp.at 1214.
57. See, e.g., Capper,757 N.E.2d at 140 (holding that lawyer who violated Rule

4.2 engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule
8.4(d)); Kent, 653 A.2d at 918 (finding that lawyer who violated Rule 4.2 also violated
Rule 8.4(d)).
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2003).
59. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
60. Id. DR 7-104(A)(l) (footnote omitted).
61. Monceret v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 29 S.W.3d 455, 459 (Tenn. 2000).
62. Id. at 460.
63. Id. at 461.
64. See, e.g., Meachum v. Outdoor World Corp., 654 N.Y.S.2d 240,245-50 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1996) (disqualifying lawyer and denying class certification where lawyer
orchestrated client's call to adversary); Trumbull County Bar Ass'n v. Makridis, 671
N.E.2d 31, 32 (Ohio 1996) (reprimanding lawyer who directed client to call adverse

party).
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mentions class actions; indeed, there is no indication that the rules ever were
intended to apply to class actions.
In cases in which the person with whom a lawyer communicates is
unrepresented by counsel, Model Rule 4.3 generally applies.65 The version of
Rule 4.3 in effect in most jurisdictions provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is
disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding."'
Rule 4.3 recognizes that when a person is unrepresented the danger that a lawyer
will overreach is great, and the rule thus restricts counsel's ability to unfairly
exploit the situation.67 The rule focuses on the lawyer's position in the matter,
rather than on the exact nature of the communication, because a lawyer's unfair
influence may be difficult to characterize.68 By requiring a lawyer to disclose his
interest or position in a matter, the reasoning goes, an unrepresented person will
be warned of the risks attending communication and will know to keep silent
until he can consult his own counsel.69 In the case of written communications,
Rule 4.3 requires a lawyer to disclose on the face of any document his interest
in the matter. °
Rule 4.3 was amended by the ABA as part of the Ethics 2000
Commission's revision of the Model Rules.7 The new version of Rule 4.3
provides:

65. Patriarca v. Ctr. for Living & Working, Inc., 778 N.E.2d 877, 880 n.5 (Mass.
2002) (explaining that if a person is unrepresented, Rule 4.3, not Rule 4.2, governs
attorney conduct); Neil S. Sullivan Assocs., Ltd. v.Medco Containment Servs., Inc., 607
A.2d 1386, 1390 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (stating that plaintiff's counsel must
obey Rule 4.3 when communicating with a defendant's unrepresented former employee).
66. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2001).
67. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING

§ 39.2, at 39-4 (3d ed. Supp. 2003).
68. Id. § 39.4, at 39-4.1.
69. Id.
70. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 909 F. Supp. 1116, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(discussing cover letter from lawyer accompanying a questionnaire).
71. A.B.A., REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L

CONDUCT 327-28 (2000) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (explaining changes to Model Rule
4.3).
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In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is
disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an
unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the
interests of the client.72
New Model Rule 4.3 distinguishes between situations involving
unrepresented persons whose interests may be adverse to the lawyer's client and
those in which there is no conflict. 7' The problem is that the new rule prohibits
a lawyer only from giving "legal advice" to an unrepresented person whose
interests may be adverse. As some scholars have observed, "If a lawyer were
interviewing a prospective defendant in a civil suit.., the lawyer might very
well be unfairly laying traps for his future opponent, but he would not be giving
'advice' in the usual meaning of the term. ' 74 The new rule does not address this
problem, and it appears that the Ethics 2000 Commission did not even appreciate
it." The question now, of course, is whether individual states will adopt the new
version of Rule 4.3.76

The Model Code addresses communications with unrepresented persons in
DR 7-104(A)(2), which provides that in representing a client a lawyer shall not:
"Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the
advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client. 77 As with the new
version of Rule 4.3, the fact that DR 7-104(A)(2) only prevents a lawyer from
giving "advice" is troublesome. If there is any question as to whether a lawyer's
remarks constitute "advice," the issue should be decided by focusing on what the
person may reasonably have thought or understood, rather than on the attorney's
intent. 8

72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2003).
73. Id. R. 4.3 cmt. 2.
74. 2 HAZARD, JR. & HODES, supra note 67, § 39.4, at 39-4.1.

75. See ABA REPORT, supra note 71, at 328 (noting "the difficulty of determining
what constitutes impermissible advice-giving," but ignoring related problems).
76. See generallyMark Hansen, Hot offthe Press: Revised Model EthicsRules Are
Nearly Ready for State Scrutiny, A.B.A. J., June 2002, at 37, 37-38 (explaining briefly
the state adoption process, and noting that it "could prove to be at least as lengthy and

difficult as it was for the ABA").
77. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-104(A)(2) (1969).

78. See, e.g., Attorney Q v. Miss. State Bar, 587 So. 2d 228, 233 (Miss. 1991)
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Communications with putative class members and members of a certified
class are also subject to regulation by the court in which the case is pending
under the broad supervisory authority conferred by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(d) and state equivalents."' As will be discussed later, a court may
even limit communications between class counsel and putative class members.8 0
Courts must have the discretion to intervene to limit communications between
attorneys for both plaintiffs and defendants and class members to prevent
misleading or otherwise improper communications, and to ensure the adequacy
and fairness of representation by class counsel. 8 Lawyers who disregard court
orders regulating communications with class members risk violating Rule 3.4(a)
and DR 7-106(A), which generally obligate lawyers to obey the rules of a
tribunal.8 2 A lawyer's violation of a court order limiting class communications

(holding that lawyer's statement, "don't worry about it," constituted legal advice under
the circumstances).
79. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1242 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)); Jenifer v. Del. Solid Waste Auth., Nos. CIV.A.
98-270 MMS, CIV.A. 98-565 MMS, 1999 WL 117762, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 1999)
(same); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., No. 1:90-CV-2485-MHS, 1992 WL
357433, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 1992) (same); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.24, at 232 (1995). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)
provides:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make
appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing
measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in
such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step
in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity
of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come
into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on
intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate
therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the
action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The
orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or
amended as may be desirable from time to time.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
80. See infra Part IlL.
81. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 79, § 30.24, at 233.
82. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c) (2003) (stating that a lawyer shall
not "knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an open
refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-106(A) (1969) (stating that a lawyer "shall not disregard.., a
standing rule of a tribunal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding,
but he may take appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of such rule or ruling").
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may also implicate Rule 8.4(d) and DR 1-102(A)(5), which prohibit conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.83
IH. CLASS COMMUNICATIONS BY PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL

A trial court must determine as soon as practicable whether a lawsuit can
be maintained as a class action.14 A court's decision to allow a case to be
maintained as a class action is referred to as "certifying" the class. 5 It is
certification that "gives birth to 'the class as ajurisprudential entity,"' and which
"changes the action from a mere individual suit with class allegations into a true
'
class action." 86
Although class certification is important for a number of reasons, it has
special meaning in the professional responsibility context. This is because courts
generally take the position that, before certification, there is no attorney-client
relationship between an attorney and putative class members other than the
named class representatives." Indeed, before certification there is no reason to
believe that an unnamed member of a putative class has an attorney-client
relationship with would-be class counsel. 8 The unnamed putative class member

83. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2003) (stating that it is
"professional misconduct" for a lawyer to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY DR 1-102(A)(5)
(1969) (stating that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice").
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
85. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 79, § 30.11, at 213.
86. Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1304 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting
Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 557 F.2d 414,425 (5th Cir. 1977) (Gee, J., dissenting)).
87. See, e.g., Parks v. Eastwood Ins. Servs., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1083-84
(C.D. Cal. 2002); EEOC v. Dana Corp., 202 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830 (N.D. Ind. 2002);
Hammond v. City of Junction City, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1286 (D. Kan. 2001); In re
McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1245 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Garrett
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 95 CIV. 2406 (PKL), 1996 WL 325725, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June
12, 1996); Palumbo v. Tele-Communications, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 129, 133 (D.D.C. 1994);
Fulco v. Cont'l Cablevision, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 45, 47 (D. Mass. 1992); Tedesco v.
Mishkin, 629 F. Supp. 1474, 1483 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 689 F.
Supp. 1032, 1033 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Amos v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 408 F. Supp. 765, 774
(E.D. Wis. 1976); In re Winchell's Donut Houses, L.P. Sec. Litig., 1988 WL 135503, at
*2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 1988); In re Chicago Flood Litig., 682 N.E.2d 421, 425-26 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997); Gillespie v. Scherr, 987 S.W.2d 129, 131-32 (Tex. App. 1999). But see
Dondore v. NGK Metals Corp., 152 F. Supp. 2d 662,664-66 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (prohibiting
ex parte communications between defense counsel and putative class members before
certification because putative class members are represented by plaintiffs' counsel).
88. Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethics of Communicating with Putative Class
Members, 17 REv. LrrIG. 497, 507 (1998).
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surely has not sought legal advice from the lawyer; he almost certainly does not
know the lawyer's identity and it is equally likely that he does not know of the
action to which he may some day become a party. The court's certification of
a class is deemed to create an attorney-client relationship between class counsel
and all class members.8 9
Even if there is no formal attorney-client relationship between class counsel
and putative class members prior to certification, they do at least share an
"incipient fiduciary relationship."9 ° The existence of this incipient fiduciary
relationship gives class counsel some class communication rights. For example,
they may provide information to putative class members beyond that given in
notices supervised by the court, respond to inquiries, and seek information
necessary to their representation of the class.91
Class counsel do not have unlimited communication rights regardless of
whether their relationship with putative class members is characterized as an
attorney-client relationship or something else. The "imperative of protecting
absent class members' interests" subjects class counsel to substantial judicial
scrutiny and regulation.92 Under Rule 23(d) a court "has inherent jurisdiction to
supervise any person or entity seeking to act on behalf of prospective members
of[a] class."93 Courts considering whether to regulate communications between
class counsel and putative class members should act principally because
inaccuracies or other problems with the challenged communications may impair
the fairness
or adequacy of the putative class' representation under Rule
9
23(a)(4). 4
It is sometimes necessary for a court to reconsider its decision certifying a
class. The discovery of new facts, changes in the parties, or substantive legal
developments may compel a court to de-certify a class. 9 De-certification
terminates the attorney-client relationship between class counsel and unnamed

89. Chicago FloodLitig., 682 N.E.2d at 425; see also Johnson, supra note 88, at

505-06.
90. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 79, § 30.24, at 233; see also
Dondore, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (stating that "putative class members stand at least in

a fiduciary relationship with class counsel") (citing In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up
Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 822 (3d Cir. 1995)).
91. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supranote 79, § 30.24, at 233.
92. 3 NEWBERG & CONTE, supranote 8, § 15.03, at 15-9.

93. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., No. 1:90-CV-2485-MHS, 1992 WL
357433, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 1992) (relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(d)(2)).
94. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 79, § 30.24, at 233. Rule
23(a)(4) provides that one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if they "will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4).
95. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 79, § 30.18, at 223.
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class members. 6 The unnamed class members then revert to being non-party
witnesses,97 and counsel for any party who wish to communicate with them may
do so, subject to ethics rules governing communications with unrepresented
persons,98 and to rules mandating honesty.99

A. Restrictions on Plaintiffs' Counsel and the Issue of PriorRestraint
Courts clearly have the authority under Rule 23(d) to enjoin
communications between counsel and class members, although that authority has
limits.' 0 The leading case on the subject of class communications is GulfOil
Co. v. Bernard.' In Gulf Oil, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") and Gulf Oil Company entered into a conciliation agreement
involving Gulf s alleged discrimination against African-American and female
employees at one of its Texas refineries. Approximately one month later, several
plaintiffs sued Gulf and another defendant on behalf of all present and former
African-American employees and rejected applicants for employment at the
refinery.'0 2 In suing under several civil rights statutes, the plaintiffs sought to
enforce the alleged rights of many employees and applicants who were receiving
settlement offers from Gulf under its conciliation agreement with the EEOC.0 3
Gulf filed a motion in the district court seeking to limit communications by
the parties and class counsel with class members.0 4 Many of the employees who
were entitled to back pay under the conciliation agreement had been paid and
signed releases by the time the class action was filed. After being served with
the class action, Gulf stopped sending back pay offers and releases to class
members.0 5 Gulf then alleged that one of the plaintiffs' lawyers had attended

96. Daniels v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 2d 562, 564-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (a) (2003) ("In the course
of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person .... "); id. R. 8.4(c) (stating that it is "professional
misconduct" for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONsIBILrY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1969)
(stating that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation"); id. DR 7-102(A)(5) ("In his representation of a client, a lawyer
shall not .... [k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact.").
100. In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1242 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
101. 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
102. Id. at 91-92.
103. Id. at 92.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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a meeting of class members at which he discussed the case and recommended
that the employees return any back pay checks that they had received and not
sign the releases sent under the conciliation agreement because they would
"receive at least double the amounts involved through the class action."' 6
The district court entered a temporary order prohibiting all counsel for all
parties from having any communications concerning the case with actual or
potential class members. The court did not, however, make any related findings
of fact.'07
Gulf moved to modify the order to allow it to continue sending mailings to
class members soliciting releases in exchange for back pay awards set pursuant
to the conciliation agreement. The plaintiffs opposed Gulf s motion, arguing that
the district court's "ban on their communications with class members violated
the First Amendment."'0 8 The court heard arguments on the motion but took no
evidence. Additional briefing, including the submission of affidavits by
plaintiffs' counsel, followed.' 9
The district court ultimately issued an order along the lines requested by
Gulf with some modifications." 0 More particularly:
This order imposed a complete ban on all communications concerning
the class action between parties or their counsel and any actual or
potential class member who was not a formal party, without the prior
approval of the court. It gave examples of forbidden communications,
including any solicitation of legal representation of potential or actual
class members, and any statements "which may tend to misrepresent
the status, purposes and effects of the class action" or "create
impressions tending without cause, to reflect adversely on any party,
any counsel, this Court, or the administration of justice." The order
exempted attorney-client communications initiated by the client, and
communications in the regular course ofbusiness. It further stated that
if any party or counsel "assert[ed] a constitutional right to
communicate.., without prior restraint," and did so communicate, he
should file with the court a copy or summary of the communication
within five days. The order, finally, exempted communications from
Gulf involving the conciliation agreement and its settlement process.'

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id. at 93-94.
Id. at94.
Id. at 94-95.
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In issuing this order the district court made no findings of fact, nor did it explain
its decision." 2
Pursuant to this order plaintiffs' counsel prepared a leaflet that they
proposed to send to class members subject to court approval. The leaflet urged
class members to consult with a lawyer before signing the releases offered by
Gulf. The leaflet referred to the class action and identified plaintiffs' counsel." 3
The plaintiffs argued that the notice provided in the leaflet enjoyed constitutional
protection and was necessary to the continued prosecution of the class action.'
Gulf opposed the motion. The court did not rule on the motion until after a
court-imposed deadline for acceptance of Gulf's offer by class members expired.
The court denied the motion without explanation." 5 As a result, the named
plaintiffs and their counsel were prevented from communicating with the class
before the deadline expired. 16
Following summary judgment, the plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit,
arguing that the various limitations on their communications imposed by the
district court exceeded the authority granted to it by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(d) and violated the First Amendment.' A divided Fifth Circuit
panel affirmed the district court. "' The Fifth Circuit then granted a rehearing en
banc, and reversed the panel decision, holding that the district court order was
an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech protected by the First
Amendment." 9 The court held that there was "no sufficient particularized
showing of need to justify such a restraint, that the restraint was overbroad, and
that it was not accompanied by the requisite procedural safeguards."' 2 Eight
judges concurred specially on the theory that the order was not appropriate under
Rule 23(d), such that it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue.' 2' Gulf
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the limiting order entered
in the district court was "consistent with the general policies embodied in Rule
23. ' In addressing this issue the Gulf Oil Court noted at the outset that
because class actions present "opportunities for abuse," district courts have and
need broad authority to control them and to enter "appropriate orders governing

112. Id.
at96.
113. Id. at 97.
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.

119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at98.
Id.
Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 99.
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the conduct of counsel and parties."' 2 3 The Court further observed, however,
that district courts do not enjoy unlimited discretion in shepherding class actions,
and that their exercise of discretion is subject to appellate review. 24
The GulfOil Court had no doubt that the district court order created at least
potential difficulties for the plaintiffs in their efforts to vindicate the legal rights
of the class.'25 As the Court explained:
The order interfered with their efforts to inform potential class
members of the existence of this lawsuit, and may have been
particularly injurious-not only to respondents but to the class as a
whole-because the employees at that time were being pressed to
decide whether to accept a backpay offer from Gulf that required them
to sign a full release of all liability for discriminatory acts. In addition,
the order made it more difficult for respondents, as the class
the merits of the case from
representatives, to obtain information about
26
represent.
to
sought
they
the persons
Because of these problems, the Court reasoned, an order limiting
communications between parties and potential class members "should be based
on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a
limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties.' ' 27 Such
a determination is required to "ensure that the court is furthering, rather than
hindering, the policies embodied in" Rule 23.12' Any order that results from this
little as possible, consistent with the parties'
weighing should limit speech as
1 29
rights under the circumstances.
The GulfOilCourt found no indication that the district court ever weighed
any competing factors. 3 ' The Court recognized that class action litigation
carries with it the potential for abuse, and that such abuses may implicate or
involve communications with class members, but "the mere possibility of abuses
does notjustify routine adoption ofa communications ban that interferes with the
formation of a class or the prosecution of a class action" in accordance with Rule

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 101.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 102.
Id.
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23.'' The Gulf Oil Court thus concluded that the district court abused its
discretion.'32
Not surprisingly, courts have scrupulously followed Gulf Oil, as Williams
v. Chartwell FinancialServices, Ltd.133 illustrates. The plaintiffs in Williams
brought a class action against Chartwell Financial Services under the federal
Truth in Lending Act.i" 4 The district court entered a protective order prohibiting
the plaintiffs from communicating with members of the putative class, all of
whom were Chartwell's customers.' 35 The district court was concerned about the
potential for abuse if the plaintiffs were allowed to communicate with
Chartwell's customers and expressed concern about the effect such
communications might have on Chartwell's business. 36 These were legitimate
concerns, the Williams court noted, and certainly presented potential
justifications for the district court's entry of the protective order.'37
Although the district court's concerns were justified, its entry of the
protective order was an abuse of discretion. This was not because the district
court was necessarily wrong. 3 Rather, as the Williams court pointed out:
After examining the district court's decision to grant a protective order
against the backdrop of the competing concerns at work in this area,
it is apparent that the district court did not develop a sufficient
appellate record for us to determine whether the interests of both
parties were adequately considered. The Supreme Court was clear in
[GulfOil] stating that when a protective order such as the one in these
cases is entered, that order should be based on a clear record and
specific findings. Other than the district court's concern over the
impact the plaintiffs' contact with putative class members would have
on Chartwell's business, it is not clear from the record what factors the
district court considered. This is not to say that the district court was
wrong. As we have stated, given the potential for abuse in class
actions a protective order is permissible under certain circumstances.
However, we cannot determine from the record below and from the
district court's findings whether those circumstances were present
39
[here].'

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 104.
Id.
204 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 749 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-2003 (2001)).
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal citation omitted).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss4/2

20

Richmond: Richmond: Class Actions and Ex Parte Communications:

2003]

CLASS COMMUNICATIONS

The court thus vacated the protective order and remanded the case to the
district court."4
Legitimate though First Amendment concerns may be, courts have limited
plaintiffs' communications with putative class members in appropriate
circumstances. In Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc.,"' two race
discrimination cases were filed against Motel 6 in the Middle District of Florida.
Both were pleaded as class actions. In the first case, known as the Jackson case,
five Motel 6 patrons alleged that Motel 6 had a nationwide practice of
discriminating against its customers based on their race.' 42 In the second, known
as the Petaccia case, five former Motel 6 employees alleged that Motel 6's
racially discriminatory practices created a hostile work environment.'4 3
The two cases were consolidated. The plaintiffs then sought relief from the
Middle District of Florida's Local Rule 4.04(e), which provides:
In every case sought to be maintained by any party as a class action,
all parties thereto and their counsel are hereby forbidden, directly or
indirectly, orally or in writing, to communicate concerning such
actions with any potential or actual class member,
not a formal party
44
to the case, without approval by the Court.
The district court granted the plaintiffs relief from the local rule, entering an
order that authorized the plaintiffs to establish an 800 number for potential
plaintiffs to call; to publish notices about the litigation nationwide and to solicit
information about potential class members and their experiences with alleged
discrimination at Motel 6 properties; to respond to requests for information from
those who responded to the notices or who called the toll free number; to make
mass mailings to Motel 6 employees soliciting information concerning the
plaintiffs' allegations; and to further communicate ex parte with anyone who
might know of the alleged discrimination except for current Motel 6 managers
and supervisors. 4' ' The district14 6court entered this order even though it had not
certified a class in either case.
After repeated attempts by Motel 6 to obtain appellate relief, the case finally
reached the Eleventh Circuit on Motel 6's second petition for a writ of
mandamus. 47
' The Jacksoncourt held that Motel 6's petition warranted relief by

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
130 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1002.
Id. (quoting M.D. FLA. R. 4.04(e)).
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1003.
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way of mandamus because the district court's order allowing the plaintiffs to
communicate with potential class members was an abuse of discretion. 4 ' The
order was entered months before a class was certified in either case. While the
Jackson court was unwilling to go so far as to state that plaintiffs should never
be allowed to communicate with putative class members prior to certification, it
was clear to it that district courts should "strive to avoid authorizing injurious
class communications that might later prove unnecessary."' 49 As the court
further explained:
An order authorizing class communications prior to class certification
is likely to be an abuse of discretion when (1) the communication
authorized by the order is widespread and clearly injurious and (2) a
certification decision is not imminent or it is unlikely that a class will
in fact be certified. In such circumstances, the danger of abuse that
always attends class communications-the possibility that plaintiffs
might use widespread publication of their claims, disguised as class
communications, to coerce defendants into settlement-is not
outweighed by any need for immediate communications.'
The plaintiffs' communications authorized by the district court's order were
widespread because they were nationwide in scope. There was also no doubt
that they were clearly injurious to Motel 6.' The Petacciacase was nowhere
near certification at the time the order was issued. ' The Jackson case could not
be certified as a class for several reasons, including the fact that the plaintiffs
were not suitable class representatives." 3 The two factors suggesting that the
district court's order was an abuse of discretion were satisfied. The court thus
vacated the district court's order and granted Motel 6 other relief.5
In summary, pre-certification communications with potential class members
by plaintiffs and their counsel are opportunities for abuse.' Courts may limit
plaintiffs' communications with putative class members even if the challenged
communication is not false, misleading or deceptive.' 5 6 Courts have the

148. Id. at 1004.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.

152. Id.
153. Id. at 1004-05.
154. Id. at 1008-09.
155. See Howard Guntz Profit Sharing Plan v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d
896, 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (scrutinizing plaintiff's communications and stating that
"[p]recertification communication carries the potential for abuse").
156. Id. at 903.
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"authority and duty" to control class actions to protect all parties' rights and "to

1 57
prevent abuses which might undermine the proper administration ofjustice."
Courts called upon to exercise their discretion should be cautious when
placing prior restraints on communications with potential class members.' 58
Perhaps more accurately, trial courts should be careful to detail the reasons for
any restraints they impose so that appellate courts may appropriately study their
exercise of discretion. 59 Regardless, in determining whether to limit class
communications prospectively, courts may wish to consider the severity and
likelihood of the perceived harm if communications are not limited, the
availability of less restrictive alternatives, and the duration of the proposed
limitation. 6 ' Plaintiffs and their counsel clearly should not be allowed to
communicate with potential class members before certification when (1) the
intended communication is or will be widespread and clearly injurious, and (2)
a decision on certification is not imminent, or it is unlikely that a class will be

certified.61

B. Places the FirstAmendment Does Not Always Reach
Although it ought to be clear from the language of the case itself, GulfOil
Co. v. Bernard62 does not turn the First Amendment into a class communication
trump card for class action plaintiffs and their counsel. The First Amendment
only prohibits certain prior restraints on class communications; it does not
immunize plaintiffs or their counsel against sanctions or any number of
corrective measures should they engage in improper communications with
potential class members.'6 3 Meek v. Gem Boat Services, Inc.164 is an illustrative
case.

157. Id. (citing Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100-03 (1981)).
158. See, e.g., Gates v. Cook, 234 F.3d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 2000) (overturning
district court's "no contact order" barring all communications between inmate class

members and class counsel without sufficient factual finding justifying the order or its
breadth).
159. See Williams v. Chartwell Fin. Servs., Ltd., 204 F.3d 748,759 (7th Cir. 2000).

160. See Rankin v. Bd. of Educ. of the Wichita Pub. Schs., 174 F.R.D. 695, 697
(D. Kan. 1997) (citing Hampton Hardware, Inc. v. Cotter & Co., 156 F.R.D. 630, 633

(N.D. Tex. 1994)).
161. Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1004 (11 th Cir. 1997).

162. 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
163. For example, ifparties or their counsel convey misinformation or misrepresent
matters to class members, a court may require them to send curative notices at their
expense. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrrIGATION, supra note 79, § 30.24, at 234; see, e.g.,
EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 102 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (declining

to review district court order requiring EEOC to send curative letter to class members).
164. 620 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
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In Meek, David Pheils, the attorney for the class, twice sent notice to the
class without being directed to do so by the court.'65 Pheils thus violated the
Ohio version of Rule 23(c)(2), which contains mandatory language indicating
that the court must order that a notice be sent.1 66 Additionally, Pheils sent the
second notice as an enclosure to his own personal cover letter and
questionnaire,' 67 both of which contained misleading information.' 68 The trial
court sanctioned Pheils by removing and barring him from further representation
in the case, and ordering him to pay several costs associated with his
9
misconduct.

6

The plaintiffs appealed, contending that Pheils should not have been
sanctioned because he was merely communicating with his clients and those
communications were protected by the First Amendment. 70 The Meek court
disagreed. The court held that the trial court's sanctions did not constitute a prior
restraint on Pheils' communications because the offending notices preceded the
sanctions.''
Furthermore, the trial court did not sanction Pheils for
communicating with his clients, but instead imposed the sanctions because Pheils
"had demonstrated an unwillingness to conduct the case in a manner required by
law, and an inability to adequately represent class members."' 72 Finally, the trial
court did not sanction the plaintiffs; it only sanctioned Pheils. In doing so, it
"acted responsibly, protecting the rights and interests of the class."' 7 a
The decision in Meek should not surprise the class action bar.
Responsibility for the content, form and timing of notices to the class rests with
the court; neither litigants nor their counsel may usurp the court's role.7 4
Furthermore, the challenged notice was misleading. Courts routinely sanction
lawyers for misleading class communications. 7

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 984-85.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 985.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 985.
Id. at 986.

171. Id.

172. Id. at 987. The trial court never prohibited Pheils from communicating with
potential class members generally. Rather, the court prohibited him from sending
improper notices to class members that also included misleading statements. Id. at 987
n.2.

173. Id. at 987. The Meek court thus affirmed the trial court's order. It also
ordered Pheils to pay the costs of the appeal. Id.

174. Rule 23 regulates notice to class members and provides for related court
supervision. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (discussing notice in class actions maintained
under subdivision (b)(3)); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) (granting authority to regulate notice

in the conduct of any action to which Rule 23 applies).
175. See, e.g., In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1239,
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The problems that plagued the attorney in Meek are not the only sort of
communication issues with which plaintiffs' counsel must be concerned.
Plaintiffs' counsel must be especially careful when communicating with
defendants' agents and employees in their case investigation and preparation, as
Meachum v. Outdoor World Corp.176 demonstrates.
The plaintiffs in Meachum purported to represent over 5,000 New York
residents to whom Outdoor World had allegedly made misrepresentations and
77
otherwise deceived in order to induce them to enter into vacation contracts.
Before suit was filed, one of the plaintiffs, Adrian Montanez, and one of the
lawyers who intended to serve as class counsel, Peter Kutil, called Outdoor
World and tape-recorded a conversation with a supervisor in its financial
department, Corine Baird, to confirm that Outdoor World would not allow
Montanez to cancel his contract without an attorney's involvement.17 1 It was
Kutil's idea to tape the conversation, and he dialed the telephone and listened to
the call without acknowledging his presence.7 7 Kutil and Montanez taped the
call "to acquire information to be used in framing and to fortify allegations to be
made" in the forthcoming class action complaint. 80 A review of the transcript
of the conversation by the court revealed "a carefully planned strategy to obtain
specific information from Ms. Baird and a concession by her on behalf of
Outdoor World."''
The plaintiffs and Kutil contended that they did not know that Outdoor
World was represented in the matter when they made the call, an argument that
the court rejected for a number of reasons. 2 The court also rejected all of the
plaintiffs' other arguments aimed at justifying the call and its taping.'83 The
Meachum court concluded that Kutil had violated the New York version of DR
7-104(A)(1).18 4 In doing so, the court branded Kutil's conduct "highly
improper," further describing it as "sharp, if not unethical practice."' 5
The problem for the Meachum court was determining what to do about the
misconduct. Kutil's misconduct, coupled with an alleged conflict of interest
involving the class representatives, cast a pall over the entire case. 8 ' The court

1243-45 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (sanctioning for misleading communications by two law firms
whose bids to serve as lead class counsel had been rejected).
176. 654 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
177. Id. at 243, 244.
178. See id. at 245-46, 247.
179. Id. at 250.
180. Id. at 246.
181. Id. at 247.
182. Id. at 247-49.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 248-50.
185. Id. at 250.
186. See id.at 254 ("The totality of the circumstances, including the complicity of
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reasoned that the "dark cloud" over the case would never be lifted so long as the
litigation continued under the control of Kutil and his fellow class counsel." 7
The court accordingly found that the named plaintiffs through their counsel
could not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.' In so finding,
the court focused again on Kutil's telephone call to Outdoor World, stating:
[T]he palpably improper and unethical conduct by counsel, in
surreptitiously tape recording the telephone conversation with [Baird],
at a time when counsel knew or should have known that [Outdoor
World] was represented by or acting through its attorneys ...

was

improper and unethical. It was deceptive, most unprofessional and
demonstrates a lack ofjudgment, sufficient to hold, as a matterof law,
that counsel is unfit toproceedfurtherin the properrepresentationof
the class in this action.8 9
The Meachum court accordingly denied the plaintiffs' motion to certify the
case as a class action despite the fact that the case was in all other ways suitable
for class treatment."'9
The court did deny the motion without prejudice,
however, thus allowing the plaintiffs to renew it when and if they secured new
class counsel.' 9'
The importance of class certification, and the related issue of the existence
of an attorney-client relationship between plaintiffs' counsel and putative class
members, is demonstrated by Hammond v. City of Junction City.'92 In
Hammond, plaintiff Marcus Hammond sued the city of Junction City and several
city officials on behalf of himself and current and former African-American
employees of the city. He alleged a variety of race discrimination claims under
state and federal statutes. 93 Trouble started when Al Hope, the city's Human
Relations Director, called one of the plaintiff's attorneys, Glenn Brown, to
discuss a race discrimination suit that Hope wanted to file against the city.'94 At
the time, the plaintiff had yet to file his motion for class action determination,
such that the case had not been certified as a class action.'95 Hope, as an
certain of the plaintiffs in the improper and unethical tape recording of a conversation
with one of defendants' supervisory employees, has cast a dark cloud upon the proposed
representation of the class by class counsel.").
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Id.

191. Id. at 254-55.
192. 167 F.Supp.2d 1271 (D.Kan.2001).
193. Id. at 1275.
194. Id. at 1276.
195. Id. at 1274.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol68/iss4/2

26

Richmond: Richmond: Class Actions and Ex Parte Communications:

2003]

CLASS COMMUNICATIONS

African-American city employee, was a potential member of the putative class.'96
Brown and Hope discussed a number of matters during their initial
telephone conference. Shortly thereafter they met in person. They were joined
in this meeting by Brown's employer and plaintiff's lead counsel, Denise
Anderson.'97 At the meeting it became clear that Hope was seeking legal
representation as an individual and as a potential representative of a class of
similarly situated minority city employees. Hope appeared to be contemplating
his individual rights and whether he would join the looming class action.' 98
Anderson presented Hope with a copy of her firm's standard retainer agreement,
which he signed.'99
After this meeting, Brown called one of the attorneys for the defendants in
Hammond's suit and left a voicemail message telling him that he and Anderson
had been retained by Hope in another race discrimination suit against the city.
Brown also indicated that Hope might be named as an additional class
representative.'O° Returning the call, defense counsel left Brown a voicemail
message saying that the defendants objected to Hope being named as a class
representative.2"' Just one day later, however, Brown met again with Hope.
During this meeting they discussed alleged discovery misconduct by the city
about which Hope claimed to know. 02 Hope's involvement in the city's efforts
at responding to discovery could not have surprised Brown; the city listed Hope
in its interrogatory answers as one of three individuals who assisted in preparing
the responses. 0 3
The defendants ultimately moved for a protective order, alleging that
Hope's ex parte communications with Brown and Anderson violated Rule 4.2.24
The defendants sought to prevent further communications between Hope and
plaintiff s counsel, to exclude evidence obtained from Hope through the ex parte
communications, and to disqualify Brown and Anderson from representing
Hammond or any other class members in the pending case.205 In deciding the
defendants' motion, the magistrate judge assigned to the case noted that the case
presented "special issues" because it involved a putative class action. 6

196. Id.
197. Id. at 1277.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. Hope alleged that temporary workers hired by the city were shredding
relevant documents from employees' personnel files. Id.
203. Id. at 1278.
204. Id. at 1274.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1275.
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Following the Supreme Court's dictates in Gulf Oil, the magistrate received
briefs from the parties and held an evidentiary hearing," 7 and made detailed
findings of fact."°
There was considerable debate about whether Hope fell within the category
of persons with whom ex parte communications were prohibited under Rule 4.2
given that the city was an organizational litigant, and whether the challenged
communications otherwise violated Rule 4.2.209 The magistrate resolved those
issues in favor of the defendants. The court was then left to decide whether the
communications should be excepted from Rule 4.2's application because (1)
Hope was a potential member of the putative class, (2) Hope and plaintiffs
counsel shared an attorney-client relationship with respect to Hope's individual
claims of discrimination, or (3) it was Hope who initiated the ex parte
communications, not plaintiffs counsel.21
Plaintiffs counsel argued that Rule 4.2 should not apply to their
communications with Hope because he was a potential member of the putative
class of African-American employees that they would be representing as class
"
counsel.21
' The court reasoned that to accept this argument it would have to find
that Hope and plaintiffs counsel had "an attorney-client or other special
relationship. 2 12 This the court declined to do, stating that it "is fairly wellsettled that prior to class certification, no attorney-client relationship exists
between class counsel and the putative class members. ' 21 3 Furthermore, it was
only speculation that a class would be certified. Even were a class certified, it
might be defined so as not to include Hope, or Hope might decide to opt out of
the class. 214 For these reasons, the court decided that no exception to Rule 4.2
should apply based on an attorney-client or other special relationship between
Hope and plaintiffs counsel derived from Hope's status as a potential class
member.215
The court also concluded that no exception to Rule 4.2 applied based on an
attorney-client relationship formed as a result of Hope's desire to have plaintiff s

207. Id. at 1274.
208. See id. at 1276-81.
209. See id. at 1281-86.
210. Id. at 1286.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., No. 95 C 3193, 1996 WL
189347, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 1996); Garrett v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 95 CIV. 2406
(PKL), 1996 WL 325725, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 1996); Fulco v. Cont'l Cablevision,
Inc., 789 F. Supp. 45, 46-47 (D. Mass. 1992); Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 689 F. Supp.
1032, 1033 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Resnick v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 376-77,
377 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1982)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
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counsel represent him on his individual claims of discrimination." 6 As the
Hammond court explained:
Admittedly, Mr. Hope and Plaintiff's counsel did eventually form an
attorney-client relationship in connection with Mr. Hope's individual
claims of race discrimination. But that relationship was only created
as a result of the improper ex parte communications with Mr. Hope.
From the veryfirst conversationwith Mr. Hope, Mr. Brown knew, or
at the very least, should have known, that Mr. Hope had managerial
responsibilities on behalf of the City that rendered him off-limits. At
that point, no further ex parte communications should have ensured.
Had no further ex parte communications taken place, no attorneyclient relationship would have been created." 7
Finally, the magistrate made short work of Brown's and Anderson's
argument that Rule 4.2 should not apply because it was Hope that initiated the
communications. The court pointed out that nothing in Rule 4.2 restricts its
application to solicitation or to the initiation of communications.2" 8 Rather, the
Rule and its commentary are concerned with all communications-notjust those
that are initiated or solicited by counsel.2" 9

Having found that plaintiff's counsel violated Rule 4.2, the magistrate then
proceeded to determine the appropriate remedy for the misconduct. In doing so,
the court again noted its responsibilities under GulfOil:
This Court also has "both the duty and the broad authority" to exercise
control over a putative class action and "to enter appropriate orders
governing the conduct of counsel and parties." As noted above...
Gulf Oil requires that the Court carefully weigh the need to limit
communications between class counsel and potential class members
against the potential interference with the rights of the parties and to
make a specific finding of the particular abuse or threatened abuse
before entering an order that limits communication between class
counsel and any putative class members.220
The magistrate disqualified plaintiffs counsel from representing Hammond
and any class members in the pending case; Anderson and Brown were allowed

216. Id. at 1287.
217. Id.

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1288 (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981)).
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to represent Hope in a separate, individual action against the city."' The court
also entered a number of other orders designed to remedy plaintiff's counsel's
misconduct.222 The plaintiff and plaintiff s counsel, who by now had secured
their own lawyers, then sought review of the magistrate's orders by the district
court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).223 They were joined by
the National Employment Lawyers Association ("NELA") as amicus curiae. 2 4
The primary argument advanced by the movants and NELA was that
counsel's communications fell within the "authorized by law exception" to Rule
4.2 by virtue of Hope's status as a potential class member.225 The movants and
NELA also argued that the magistrate judge disregarded the Supreme Court's
directions set forth in GulfOil. 226 The district court addressed the second claim
first, pointing out that the magistrate in fact paid special attention to his special
obligations under Gulf Oil.227 Indeed, the argument that the magistrate ignored
the special issues posed by a class action or his special procedural
responsibilities under GulfOil was laughable.
The movants andNELA cited a number of cases, all of which, they claimed,
supported their argument that class counsel can have ex parte communications
with putative class members without running afoul of Rule 4.2.28 The district
court found all of the cases to be "easily and significantly distinguished. 2 29
Those cases did, however, suggest the course of conduct that plaintiffs
counsel should have followed:
In short, a reading of the cases proffered by the movants and NELA
clearly suggests that if the Law Finn desired to speak with Mr. Hope
or any other potential class member, then the Law Firm should have
filed a motion with the court seeking guidance on that issue before
engaging in any communications. This reasoned approach would have
permitted the court, consistent with GulfOil, to assess the need for any
limitation on such communications, the potential for any abuse, and

221. Id. at 1291.
222. See id. at 1294-95.
223. Hammond v. City of Junction City, No. 00-2146-JWL, 2002 WL 169370, at
*1 (D. Kan. Jan. 23, 2002); FED. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
224. Hammond, 2002 WL 169370, at *1.
225. Id. at *3.
226. Id.
227. Id. at *34.
228. The movants and NELA relied on Blanchardv. EdgeMarkFinancialCorp.,
175 F.R.D. 293 (N.D. Ill. 1997), Dondore v. NGK Metals Corp., 152 F. Supp. 2d 662
(E.D. Pa. 2001), Hoffman v. United Telecommunications, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 332 (D. Kan.
1986), andAbdallahv. Coca-ColaCo., 186 F.R.D. 672 (N.D. Ga. 1999). See Hammond,
2002 WL 169370, at *4-5.
229. Hammond, 2002 WL 169370, at *4.
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any interference with the rights of the parties. By engaging in such
communications without first seeking guidance from the
court-communications that the Law Firm clearly knew were at least
potentially violative of Rule 4.2-the Law Firm ran the risk that its
conduct would
be challenged and, ultimately, the basis for appropriate
3
2

sanctions.

1

The movants and NELA made a number of other arguments, only some of
which bear mention here. First, they contended that Rule 4.2 was inapplicable
because plaintiffs counsel and Hope shared an attorney-client relationship by
virtue of the fact that Hope called plaintiff's counsel about representing him in
" ' According to plaintiff's
connection with his individual claims against the city.23
counsel and NELA, "plaintiffs counsel cannot be logically accused of having
ex parte communications with their own client. 2 32 As the district court pointed
out, however, the magistrate had quite logically rejected this argument, reasoning
that no attorney-client relationship existed at the time of the initial ex parte
contact:
Admittedly, Mr. Hope and Plaintiffs counsel did eventually form an
attorney-client relationship in connection with Mr. Hope's individual
claims of race discrimination. But that relationship was only created
as a result of the improper ex parte communications with Mr. Hope.
From the veryfirst conversationwith Mr. Hope, [the Law Finn] knew,
or at the very least, should have known, that Mr. Hope had managerial
responsibilities on behalf of the City that rendered him off-limits. At
that point, no further ex parte communications should have ensued.
Had no further ex parte communications taken place, no attorneyclient relationship would have been created.233
There simply was no basis for the district court to conclude that the magistrate's
decision on this point was clearly erroneous.3
Second, plaintiffs counsel contended that the city consented to their ex
parte communications with Hope because it knew or should have known that
Hope was a potential adversary.235 The court found this argument unpersuasive,
reasoning that "it would be unjust on the part of the city (and potentially

230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. (quoting parties' court papers).
Id. (quoting Hammond v. City of Junction City, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1287

(D. Kan. 2001)).
234. Id. at *8.

235. Id.
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discriminatory in and of itself) if the city assumed that its African American
managers suddenly became 'the enemy' just because a class action race
discrimination suit was filed against it."236 As noted previously, Hope had
assisted the city with responding to discovery in the putative class action,237 and
prior to assisting with the production of documents in the case allegedly had told
the city attorney that he "believed he would be involved in the lawsuit. ' 23 Even
that statement, however, was insufficient to establish that the city had somehow
consented to Hope's ex parte communications with plaintiffs counsel.239
In the end, the movants could not establish that the magistrate had erred in
applying Rule 4.2 to Hope's communications with plaintiffs counsel. The
district court overruled their objections to the magistrate's orders.24 0
Hammondteaches that which should be obvious: plaintiffs' counsel should
proceed cautiously when seeking to communicate with defendants' employees.2 "
Plaintiffs' counsel who wish to communicate with defendants'
employees-especially managerial or supervisory employees-should seek leave
of court to do so.242 A court presented with such a motion can then balance the
plaintiffs' interests with those of the defendant and, if necessary, tailor an order
that will protect the parties' respective rights.243

236. Id.
237. Hope's participation in responding to discovery on behalf of the city was an
issue in the magistrate's Rule 4.2 analysis. See Hammond, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1282.
238. Hammond, 2002 WL 169370, at *8n.9.
239. Id.
240. Id. at *9.

241. There is good reason to question why plaintiff's counsel ever thought that it
was acceptable to communicate with Hope without the city's consent. Hope's title was

"Director of Human Relations," and he had been identified in interrogatory answers as
having assisted in preparing the city's discovery responses. Hammond, 167 F. Supp. 2d
at 1276-78. While it is true that Hope downplayed his managerial responsibilities when
talking to Brown, see id. at 1277, all of the other facts known to Brown and Anderson
clearly suggested that their communications with Hope were fraught with peril.
242. See, e.g., EEOC v. Dana Corp., 202 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830 (N.D. Ind. 2002)
(allowing plaintiff to have ex parte communications with former managerial employee
of defendant; both plaintiff and defendant filed motions seeking to conduct ex parte

interviews); Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 186 F.R.D. 672, 677-78 (N.D. Ga. 1999)
(sustaining plaintiffs' motion for leave to interview prospective class members and thus
allowing defendant's upper level employees to communicate with plaintiffs' counsel
about potential discrimination claims).
243. See Abdallah, 186 F.R.D. at 677 (allowing plaintiffs' counsel to communicate
with defendant's upper level employees about their discrimination claims, but not
permitting any other communications, and further preventing plaintiffs' counsel from
communicating with employees at work unless the employees had retained plaintiffs'
counsel).
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IV. CLASS COMMUNICATIONS BY DEFENDANTS
AND THEIR COUNSEL

Defendants can sometimes anticipate that they will be the target of a class
action. Before suit is filed, a prospective defendant is free to fairly and honestly
communicate with potential class members in an effort to head off litigation.2"
Even after a suit is filed, if it is not pleaded as a class action, defense counsel
may communicate with potential claimants to try to prevent a class action from
developing.245 Once a class action is filed or a lawsuit on file is amended to
become a class action, however, the rules change.
A. An Introduction and Some Fundamentals
Class action plaintiffs sometimes suggest that the protections afforded by
Gulf Oil apply only to them, and that courts can restrain defendants'
communications with class members without making detailed factual findings
or weighing the potential interference with defendants' rights.24 This simply is
not so. 24 7 Before restricting a defendant's communications with prospective

class members, a court must make a clear record and specific findings in
accordance with GulfOil that reflect "a weighing of the need for limitation and
'
the potential interference with the rights of the parties."248
And, just as when
plaintiffs or their counsel are sought to be restrained or enjoined, any order
restraining speech on the defendant's side must be narrowly drawn to limit
speech as little as possible, consistent with the parties' rights.249 Indeed, courts
presented with motions to limit defendants' communications with putative class
members
routinely analyze the issues in light of the rules established in Gulf
250
Oil.

244. 3 NEWBERG & CONTE, supranote 8, § 15.11, at 15-37 ("When no class action
is filed, a prospective defendant is free to communicate with potential class members in
order to remedy alleged grievances and obtain releases from liability ... . Threatening
potential class members with legal, economic, or political sanctions should theyjoin the
class or initiate litigation would, however, raise serious ethical questions of propriety.").
245. See Gillespie v. Scherr, 987 S.W.2d 129, 132 n.6 (Tex. App. 1999)

(explaining that until a court certifies a case as a class action, the case proceeds as an
ordinary lawsuit brought by the named plaintiffs on their own behalf, and that potential
class members do not have an interest in the case unless and until a class is certified).
246. See Abdallah, 186 F.R.D. at 675 n.1.

247. Id. ("[T]he Supreme Court's opinion [in Gulf Oil] clearly addresses
communications between all parties and potential class members, as it should.").
248. Great Rivers Coop. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 59 F.3d 764, 766 (8th Cir. 1995)
(citing Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981)).
249. Id. (citing GulfOil, 452 U.S. at 102).
250. See, e.g., Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 207 F.R.D. 16 (D. Mass.
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Defendants typically want to communicate with putative class members
about settlement. As a general rule, a defendant has the right to communicate
settlement offers to putative class members before a class is certified."' Once
a class is certified, however, a defendant may only negotiate settlements through
class counsel. 52 Defendants should scrupulously avoid ex parte communications
with class representatives at any time, for class representatives clearly are3
2
represented by class counsel for purposes of Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1).
Blanchardv. EdgeMark FinancialCorp.254 illustrates the hazards that attend
defense attorneys' contact with class members after certification and with class
representatives.
Blanchardwas a securities class action. Joseph Beale was the sole class
representative. Throughout the course of the litigation Beale was represented by
attorney Paul Carroll, but, for purposes of the class action, he was represented

2002) (declining to limit communications); Bublitz v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
196 F.R.D. 545 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (imposing conditions on defendant's communications
with putative class members); Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 239
(E.D. Tex. 1997) (declining to limit defendant's communications); Rankin v. Bd. of
Educ. of the Wichita Pub. Schs., 174 F.R.D. 695 (D. Kan. 1997) (limiting
communications); H & R Block, Inc. v. Haese, 82 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. App. 2000)
(rejecting some limitations imposed by trial court).
251. Christensen v. Kiewit-Murdock Inv. Corp., 815 F.2d 206, 213 (2d Cir. 1987);
Jenifer v. Del. Solid Waste Auth., Nos. CIV.A. 98-270 MMS, CIV.A. 98-565 MMS,
1999 WL 117762, at *3 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 1999); Cada v. Costa Line, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 95,
98 (N.D. Ill. 1981); In re Winchell's Donut Houses, L.P. Sec. Litig., 1988 WL 135503,
at *I (Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 1988); Arriola v. Time Ins. Co., 751 N.E.2d 221,226 (111. App.
Ct. 2001); Jankousky v. Jewel Cos., 538 N.E.2d 689, 691 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); see also
Parks v. Eastwood Ins. Servs., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ("In a
Rule 23 class action, pre-certification communication from the defense to prospective
plaintiffs is generally permitted."); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 79,
§ 30.24, at 233.
252. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 79, § 30.24, at 234; see, e.g.,
Blanchard v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 293,300-05 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that
defense lawyer who negotiated settlement with class representative's personal attorney
instead of class counsel violated Rule 4.2, disqualifying defense lawyer, and imposing
other sanctions); Larry James Oldsmobile-Pontiac-GMC Truck Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
175 F.R.D. 234, 240-46 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (sanctioning defense lawyer who negotiated
settlement through class representative's corporate counsel rather than negotiating
through class counsel; court held that lawyer violated Rule 4.2).
253. Blanchard,175 F.R.D. at 301 (ultimately disqualifying defense attorney for
violating Rule 4.2 and imposing other sanctions) (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, supra note 79, § 30.2, at 234).
254. 175 F.R.D. 293 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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by an attorney from another firm, Reuben Hedlund.2" The class was certified
in August 1995,256 and Hedlund clearly was class counsel.
In 1996, Carroll approached the defendants on Beale's behalf to discuss a
possible settlement. The defendants' attorney, Daniel Gravelyn, negotiated a
settlement with Beale. 25' Hedlund did not participate in the settlement
negotiations.25 Gravelyn ignored Hedlund even though he knew that Hedlund
was class counsel.259
Although the settlement provided that the class action would continue and
2 60
provided for a reasonable time for Beale to be replaced as class representative,
the plaintiffs moved to vacate the settlement and sought sanctions.261 Among
other things, the plaintiffs alleged that Gravelyn violated Rule 4.2 by negotiating
a settlement with Beale without Hedlund's permission.262 The Blanchardcourt
263
agreed.
The defendants first argued that Gravelyn's conduct did not violate Rule 4.2
because he never spoke directly with Beale, instead negotiating with Carroll.
Conjunctively, they argued that Gravelyn did not violate Rule 4.2 because
6
Carroll was Beale's chosen counsel for purposes of settlement negotiations. 2 1
The Blanchardcourt rejected both arguments. With respect to the first, Carroll
undoubtedly conveyed Gravelyn's communications to Beale. Gravelyn's use of
Carroll as a conduit to Beale, while admittedly indirect contact, implicated many
of the same concerns and posed many of the same risks that would have been
present had Gravelyn communicated directly with Beale. 26' As for the second
argument, Beale's consent to have Carroll represent him in settlement
negotiations did not change the fact that as class counsel Hedlund had the right
to control communications with Beale about the subject of his representation. 2"
Furthermore, it appeared to the court that Carroll was not capable of representing
the absent class members' interests, and Gravelyn's ex parte communications
clearly impaired the attorney-client relationship between Beale and Hedlund.267

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 297.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 300-01, 304.
Id. at 297-98.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.

Id.
Id.

266. Id. at 302 (stating that "it is only the consent of the adverse party's counsel
that allows an attorney to communicate with the adverse party with ethical impunity").

267. Id.
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Finally, the defendants argued that Gravelyn did not violate Rule 4.2
because, although Hedlund was aware of the negotiations, he did not attempt to
become involved in or halt them.2 61 In other words, Hedlund had acquiesced to
the communications, and had thus consented to them within the meaning of Rule
4.2. The court also rejected this argument, stating:
Contrary to Defendants' contentions, Mr. Hedlund did not consent to
the communications because failure to intervene is not equivalent to
affirmative consent. Rule 4.2 places the burden of obtaining consent
on the attorney who wishes to speak with the adverse party. This
Court will not turn the rule on its head and thereby read it to require
the represented party's counsel to take active steps toward preventing
opposing counsel's communication with his client before a violation
of the rule will be deemed to have occurred. It is the individual
responsibility of each attorney to ensure that his or her conduct is in
compliance with the relevant RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT and Defendants cannot seriously contend that, because
they were not prevented from violating Rule 4.2, they cannot be held
accountable for the unethical nature of their conduct. 6 9
The Blanchardcourt concluded that Gravelyn's violation of Rule 4.2 was both
"serious and intentional. 27' Accordingly, the court disqualified Gravelyn and
imposed other sanctions on the defendants.27'
Could Gravelyn have avoided the calamity that befell him? Certainly.
When approached by Carroll, he should have alerted Hedlund, and declined to
speak further with Carroll unless and until Hedlund consented to their
communication. If he did not want to deal with Hedlund, or if Hedlund refused
to consent to Gravelyn's ex parte communications with Beale or with Carroll as
Beale's agent, Gravelyn could have sought the court's permission to discuss
settlement with Beale or Carroll in Hedlund's absence. 2
Defendants may want to communicate ex parte with potential class
members for reasons other than settlement, though still with an eye toward
gaining a litigation advantage. In class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3), a
court must give class members the option to exclude themselves from the
litigation, and they typically are given this option in other kinds of class actions

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 304.
271. Id.at 305.
272. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA,LEGAL ETHICS § 32-2, at 555 (2002-03) (stating
that "ina class action, defense attorneys may secure a court order allowing

communication with members of the plaintiff class inappropriate circumstances").
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as well.273 A class member's decision to withdraw from the litigation is known
as "opting out," and the time that a court gives class members to do that typically
is known as the "opt out" period.274 Defendants may want to encourage class
members to opt out, perhaps in an effort to defeat class certification by
destroying numerosity, and perhaps simply to minimize their potential damage
exposure. Courts take an especially dim view of defendants' attempts to
persuade class members to opt out of litigation.275 Such communications are
believed to reduce the effectiveness of class actions as an economic means of
litigation and to otherwise undermine the purposes of Rule 23.276
Regardless of whether a defendant's ex parte communications with putative
class members are directed at settlement or at persuading members to opt out of
the litigation, courts are particularly concerned about the potential for
coercion. 7 "The test for coercion is whether the [defendant's] conduct
somehow overpowers the free will or business judgment of the potential class
members."27
B. Pre-CertificationSettlements and Efforts to Discourage
Participationin Litigation
Although courts routinely hold that defendants may communicate with
putative class members about the resolution of their individual claims before a
class is certified, they often appear to do so grudgingly.279 This is because
improper communications threaten the fair resolution of the litigation.2"' Even
so, courts must be careful not to overstep their bounds when supervising
defendants' conduct. This is especially true where a defendant has an on-going
business relationship with potential class members.28 Defendants may need to

273. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supranote 79, § 30.231, at 231.
274. See id. ("[C]lass members should be afforded a reasonable time to exercise
their option. Courts usually establish a period of thirty to sixty days following mailing
of the notice, or longer if appropriate, for filing the election.").
275. See, e.g., Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985)
(affirming district court decision disqualifying and fining defense lawyer who helped
formulate scheme to persuade class members to opt out).
276. Id. at 1202, 1202 n.19 (discussing Rule 23(b)(3) actions).
277. Id. at 1202 (observing that "[a] unilateral communications scheme.., is rife
with potential for coercion").
278. Jenifer v. Del. Solid Waste Auth., Nos. CIV.A 98-270 MMS, CIV.A 98-565
MMS, 1999 WL 117762, at *5 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 1999).
279. See id. at *2-3.
280. See id. at *2.

281. SeeIn re Winchell's Donut Houses, L.P. Sec. Litig., 1988 WL 135503, at *1
(Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 1988) ("Particularly where the class is comprised of persons with
whom the defendant has an ongoing commercial relationship, it would seem distinctly
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communicate with class members as part of their regular business activities.
Beyond that, putative class members may be interested in receiving settlement
offers or in hearing a defendant's perspective on the litigation. Putative class
members may have interests or needs that are different from those of the class
representatives, and courts are wrong to discount or disregard that possibility, or
to assume that putative class members always need protection from defendants.
After all, "class members do not become wards, incompetent to deal with their
own property, by reason of the unilateral filing of class action complaints by one
of their number."2" 2
Courts should nonetheless limit pre-certification class communications by
defendants where those communications pose a serious potential for harm to
class members' interests.2"' A defendant may not deceive or mislead class
members through otherwise permissible communications.284 Hampton
Hardware, Inc. v. Cotter & Co.285 illustrates the kind of coercive
communications by a defendant that courts seek to prohibit.
Hampton Hardware was a potential class action brought by Hampton
Hardware, Inc., which operated a True Value hardware store in Oak Cliff, Texas.
Hampton sued Cotter, a member-owned hardware wholesaler. Cotter operated
on a cooperative basis for the benefit of its members, including Hampton.2" 6
Hampton, on behalf of itself and other owners of other True Value hardware
stores in Texas, alleged that Cotter improperly assessed monthly service
charges.28 7 Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, Cotter's president wrote three
288
letters to potential class members urging them not to participate in the lawsuit.
The first letter, written in July 1993, provided:
While we believe that Cotter will win this case for many reasons, it is
important that you understand the enormous potential cost to your
Company due to this class action. Your team in Chicago will spend
thousands of hours on this lawsuit, pulling old documents,
reconstructing records, traveling to Dallas and explaining the service
charge policy and how your Company operates. Teams of lawyers
ill-advised to attempt to require the defendant to deal with what may be an important
aspect of a commercial relationship only through the channel of a self-appointed class
action plaintiff.").
282. Id. (citing Webster Eisenlohr, Inc. v. Kalodner, 145 F.2d 316, 318 (3d Cir.
1944)).
283. Fraley v. Williams Ford Tractor & Equip. Co., 5 S.W.3d 423, 434-35 (Ark.
1999); H &R Block, Inc. v. Haese, 82 S.W.3d 331, 335-36 (Tex. App. 2000).
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Winchell's Donut Houses, 1988 WL 135503, at *1.
156 F.R.D. 630 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id.
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will be required, all at a huge cost. These and other expenses needed
to protect your company in this suit will be endless. All of this will
cost you precious dollars and us time from our mission which is to
make you succeed in the hardware and variety business.
What can you do to avoid this waste of time and money? Decide not
to participate in this lawsuit. Under the law you may be given the
opportunity to join the class. By refusing to join the class, you save
your Company time and expenses which ultimately will be returned to
you in the form of your patronage dividend. Every member who joins
the class adds to the expense and time needed to protect your
Company and you. The expense will, ultimately, come out of your
pocket.289
The second letter, written in August 1993, stated:
It is extremely important that you are fully aware of the class action
lawsuit that one Texas Member is filing against Cotter & Company.
Considering the expense and potentially negative impact on your
Company, awareness of this case and your support are vital.... [The
plaintiff] and his lawyer want to represent all Texas Members against
Cotter & Company. By not participating in this suit, you will help
save your Company expense in dollars and time.29
The third and final letter, sent in October 1993, stated:
As many of you know one East Texas Member is so supportive of his
Company, and so strongly believes that this case is improper and
without justification, he began sending releases and waivers to several
other Members. He has been forwarding back to us copies of these
waivers which many of you have signed.
I believe the support you are showing your Company, after having
invested so much of your time and money in it, is sensible and proper.
By asking you to join the class, Hampton is asking you to sue
yourself.29 '
Hampton contended that the letters were improper and sought an order
prohibiting Cotter from communicating further with prospective class members.

289. Id.
290. Id. at 631-32.
291. Id. at 632.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

39

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 2
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Cotter countered that the letters were protected speech under the First
Amendment. It also argued that the letters were required by SEC disclosure
rules and were nothing more than the routine dissemination of information to its
members.292
The Hampton Hardwarecourt reasoned that the first issue to be determined
was whether the three letters were misleading communications that justified
judicial intervention.293 This they clearly were. Regardless of Cotter's stated
purpose in sending them, the letters obviously were intended to prevent member
participation in the class action.294 Furthermore, because Cotter and the class
members shared an on-going business relationship, the potential for coercion
justified the court's intervention.295 As the court explained:
Members must necessarily rely upon the defendant for dissemination
of factual information regarding hardware goods and for lower prices
in purchasing those goods. They are therefore particularly susceptible
to believing the defendant's comments that the lawsuit will cost them
money. Cotter, on the other hand, an interested party in the litigation
faces a conflict of interest in advising members on the merits of
participation in the lawsuit due to its direct pecuniary interest in the
outcome.296
Testimony by the owner of a member hardware store established a serious
potential for harm to class members' interests flowing from the three letters.2 97
The court reasoned that the potential for serious abuse was sufficient for it to act;
the plaintiff was not required to prove actual harm attributable to the letters in
order to justify limiting defense communications.298
Having determined that Cotter's communications with potential class
members were improper and thus had to be limited, the next question was how
to fashion appropriate relief drawn as narrowly as possible. In framing its order,
the court looked first at the severity and likelihood of the perceived harm posed
by the letters. 29 9 The court easily determined that the relationship between Cotter
and cooperative members justified the prohibition of future communications,
stating:

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 842 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Id.
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With respect to the first factor, the perceived harmi, the fact that the
members must rely upon the defendant for crucial information as to
pricing renders potential class members particularly vulnerable to
coercion. Cotter determines pricing for its members and is now
warning them that prices will go up if the lawsuit continues. Members
are thus less likely to feel that participation in the lawsuit is in their
best interest. This in turn undermines the goals of Rule 23. Thus all
communications regarding the suit should be prohibited. 00
The court next considered the breadth of its order prohibiting
communications between Cotter and potential class members. In doing so, it
attempted to strike a balance between protecting class members from making
decisions based on biased communications from Cotter, while at the same time
trying not to interfere with the on-going business relationship between Cotter and
the class members.3"' The court thus prohibited all communications concerning
the litigation while permitting regular business communications.30 2
The Hampton Hardware court then had to consider the availability of
alternatives less onerous than an absolute ban on communications. Quite simply,
there were none.30 3 The court could not "conceive of any advice from Cotter
regarding the lawsuit that [was] not rife with the potential for confusion and
abuse given Cotter's interest in the suit."3 4
Finally, the court determined that its order limiting defense communications
with potential class members should run through trial.30 Any shorter duration
would prove unnecessarily troublesome. Because tie court had already
determined that Cotter could communicate with its members about business
matters unrelated to the litigation, an order of such lengthy duration was unlikely
to disrupt their business relationship.30 6
The plaintiffs also sought a court order directing Cot.ter to send a corrective
notice to prospective class members at its expense. The court declined to enter
such an order. Although the plaintiff had demonstrated a clear potential for
abuse, there was little evidence of actual harm.30 7 Moreover, because the court
had yet to certify a class, any corrective notice would be potentially confusing
and premature? 8 If the court ultimately were to certif4 the class, its notice to

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 633-34.
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id.
Id.

305. Id.

306. Id.
307. Id. at 635.
308. Id.
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class members would provide the objective information required by Rule
23(c)." 9 For these reasons a corrective notice was not required. 10
Fraley v. Williams Ford Tractor & Equipment Co.3"' is another case in
which a defendant's allegedly coercive and misleading communications were
31 2
challenged. Fraleywas a class action filed under the Truth in Lending Act.
The plaintiffs alleged that when Williams Ford sold equipment it financed
premiums for property and credit life insurance as part of the related installment
sales contracts and security agreements.313 If a customer paid the full purchase
price of the equipment early, the insurance company refunded any unearned
premium to Williams Ford, but Williams Ford allegedly never passed along that
refund to the customer.3 4
Before two proposed classes could be certified, Williams Ford began calling
all of the potential class members. Williams Ford representatives attempted to
discourage customers' participation in the lawsuit, discussed the merits of the
case with customers, and persuaded most customers that they had consented to
Williams Ford's retention of their unearned insurance premiums. 31 5 Williams
Ford was able to obtain releases from the overwhelming majority of the potential
class members.3t 6 However, its representatives never told the potential class
members the amount of any refunds they might get if the class action were
successful, nor did they tell them about the potential for a punitive damage
award, and the communications were otherwise confusing and misleading.3" 7
With a few exceptions, Williams Ford gave no consideration for the releases it
obtained. a 8
Williams Ford's pre-certification campaign proved to be a success. The
trial court denied the plaintiffs' class certification motion, holding that they could

309. Id. Rule 23(c) governs notice to class members in any class action maintained
under Rule 23(b)(3), and provides:
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the
member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date; (B) the
judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not
request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may,
if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel.
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(2).
310. Hampton Hardware, 156 F.R.D. at 635.
311. 5 S.W.3d 423 (Ark. 1999).
312. Id. at 426; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-2003 (2001).
313. Fraley,5 S.W.3d at 426.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 436.
316. Id. at 435.
317. Id. at 435-36.
318. Id. at 428.
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not satisfy the numerosity and predominance requirements.319 The trial court
specifically approved Williams Ford's pre-certification communications with
potential class members.32 ° The plaintiffs eventually appealed the trial court's
denial of class certification to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
The propriety of a defendant's pre-certification communications with
" ' The
potential class members was a question of first impression for the court.32
parties took polar opposite positions: the plaintiffs urged the court to prohibit all
unsupervised, ex parte communications between defendants and potential class
members, while Williams Ford argued that defendants' pre-certification
communications with potential class members are always proper.322 The Fraley
court rejected both positions.323 The court instead was persuaded that a
defendant's pre-certification communications with potential class members
should be restricted or prohibited when they are intended to "substantially reduce
member participation in the class action," or when they "otherwise indicate a
likelihood of coercion or a serious potential for harm to the interests of the class
action."324
Guided by these principles, the Fraleycourt easily concluded that Williams
Ford's pre-certification communications with potential class members were
improper.32 The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by
considering the communications and the resulting releases in declining to certify
the proposed classes.326 The court further held that the trial court erred in
deciding the numerosity and predominance requirements against the plaintiffs.327
Arriola v. Time Insurance Co.32 stands at the opposite end of the precertification communication spectrum. In Arriola, the defendant, Time
Insurance Company, was sued in a class action in an Illinois state court. Before
the plaintiff moved to certify the class, Time obtained releases from forty-four
of the forty-six Illinois policyholders in an effort to defeat the numerosity
required for class certification and thus avoid liability to a larger group of
policyholders in other states.329 The plaintiff alleged that Time's efforts to obtain

319. Id.

320. Id.
321. Id. at 432.
322. Id. at 434.
323. Id.

324. Id. at 434-35 (citing Hampton Hardware, Inc. v. Cotter & Co., 156 F.R.D. 630
(N.D. Tex. 1994)).
325. See id. at 436.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 436-38. The Fraleycourt reversed the trial court and remanded the case
for further proceedings. Id. at 439.
328. 751 N.E.2d 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).

329. Id. at 224-26.
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these releases constituted impermissible communications with putative class
members.330

The plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the releases. There was no
evidence of coercion by Time, nor was there any evidence that it misrepresented
facts to potential class members in obtaining the releases.331 For this reason, and
because the plaintiff had not moved to certify the class when Time obtained the
releases, the Arriola court held that Time's communications with the putative
class members were proper.332
Although they are the exception rather than the rule, cases such as Hampton
333 and Fraley
33 4 demonstrate that courts
Hardware
do have some reason to be
concerned about defendants' ex parte communications with potential class
members. Courts are most concerned about potential coercion in cases in which
the defendant has an ongoing business relationship with potential class
members,3 35 and in cases in which the potential class members are employed by
the defendant. 336 In the business relationship context, the potential for coercion
is greatest where the defendant is the putative class members' principal or sole
supplier, or represents the dominant market for the putative class members'
products or services aa3 The potential for coercion is also great where the
putative class members depend on the defendant for credit or financing.338
While courts must be sensitive to potential coercion, the mere potential for
coercion does not justify courts' prior restraint of defendants' ex parte

330. Id. at 226.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 230-31.

333. Hampton Hardware, Inc. v. Cotter & Co., 156 F.R.D. 630 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
334. Fraley v. Williams Ford Tractor & Equip. Co., 5 S.W.3d 423 (Ark. 1999).
335. See, e.g., Ralph Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 99 CIV. 4567
(AGS), 2001 WL 1035132, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7,2001) (finding potential for coercion

because GM dealers making up the potential class depended on the defendant for credit,
information and supplies, and were solely dependent upon the defendant to supply them
with vehicles).
336. See, e.g., Bublitz v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 196 F.R.D. 545,548 (S.D.
Iowa 2000) ("Where the defendant is the current employer of putative class members
who are at-will employees, the risk of coercion is particularly high; indeed, there may in
fact be some inherent coercion in such a situation."); Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 186
F.R.D. 672, 678 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (observing that "simple reality suggests that the danger
of coercion is real" when potential class members are employed by the defendant).
337. See, e.g., Ralph Oldsmobile, 2001 WL 1035132, at *4 (noting potential class
members' dependence on the defendant for credit, information and supplies); Hampton
Hardware, 156 F.R.D. at 633 (finding that potential class members were susceptible to
coercion because they relied on the defendant for low-priced supplies and for
information).
338. Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 751 F.2d 1193, 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
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communications with putative class members.339 Speculation about coercive
communications will not suffice. Rather, to justify prior restraint there must be
"actual or threatened misconduct of a serious nature."3 ' Where actual harm
cannot be shown, plaintiffs must offer evidence that a potential for serious abuse
" ' Absent such evidence,
exists.34
a court cannot intervene.342 This is true even
in the context of employment litigation, where the potential for coercion arguably
is greatest.343
A defendant is free to tell potential class members that it has been sued and
even to express its views on the litigation, so long as it does not make explicit or
implicit threats, or attempt to mislead potential class members. 3" The mere fact
that a defendant chooses to keep its customers or employees informed about
litigation affecting the company does not evidence an improper motive.343
Similarly, a defendant is free to communicate with putative class members about
business transactions that may in some way be related to the subject of the class
action provided that the transactions are fair. 346 A defendant's business cannot
grind to a halt simply because it is the target of a class action. Of course, a
defendant is always free to communicate with potential class members about
business or employment matters unrelated to the litigation.347
In conclusion, plaintiffs' concerns about potential coercion are as a general
rule exaggerated, overblown and overstated.348 Plaintiffs' counsel typically want

339. Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 239, 244 (E.D. Tex.

1997).
340. Great Rivers Coop. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 59 F.3d 764, 766 (8th Cir. 1995)
(citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 30.24, at 232 (1985)).
341. Basco v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CIV.A. 00-3184,2002 WL 272384, at *3
(E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2002); Burrell, 176 F.R.D. at 244.
342. Basco, 2002 WL 272384, at *3; Burrell, 176 F.R.D. at 244.
343. Basco, 2002 WL 272384, at *3-4; Burrell, 176 F.R.D. at 24445.
344. Burrell, 176 F.R.D. at 244-45; see, e.g., Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CIV.A.
3:01-CV-1 179-P, 2002 WL 226347, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2002) (declining to limit

defendant's communications with potential class members where plaintiff "failed to
allege or prove any instances of targeted letters or announcements designed to threaten
or intimidate potential class members if they were to join the litigation").
345. Burrell, 176 F.R.D. at 245.

346. See, e.g., Jenifer v. Del. Solid Waste Auth., Nos. CIV.A. 98-270 MMS,
CIV.A. 98-565 MMS, 1999 WL 117762, at *5 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 1999) (approving
communications that related "to a business proposition which potential class members
[were] free to reject if they decide[d] the costs outweigh[ed] the benefits").
347. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 79, § 30.24, at 234.
348. See, e.g., Basco, 2002 WL 272384, at *4 (declining to rule for plaintiffs who
could "only state that they believe[d]" that the defendant might communicate with
potential class members); Lee, 2002 WL 226347, at *2 (finding no basis to limit
defendant's communications with potential class members); Jenifer, 1999 WL 117762,
at *8 (holding that plaintiffs did not offer sufficient evidence of potential coercion or
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to limit or prohibit defendants' communications with putative class members not
because they truly fear coercion, but because they fear truthful communications
and reasonable individual settlements that will have the effect of reducing the
expected fee awards.349 For this reason alone courts should be reluctant to
restrain defendants' communications with putative class members. In the event
challenged communications actually are coercive, a court can always send a
curative notice at the defendant's expense."
V. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AFTER CERTIFICATION
BUT BEFORE OPT OUT: WHAT THE LAW Is
AND WHAT IT SHOULD BE
A class is in a state of flux between the time it is certified by the court and
" ' The putative class may contain members
the time the opt out period expires.35
who will choose to exclude themselves from the class. Accordingly, some courts
hold that while certification changes the relationship between plaintiffs' counsel
and the putative class members, it creates only a "potential attorney-client
relationship.""' 2 Other courts recognize that class certification creates an
attorney-client relationship between class counsel and class members (as
compared to a "potential" attorney-client relationship), but still discount the
relationship during the opt out period. The court in Tedesco v. Mishkin,3" for
example, described the relationship between class counsel and absent class
members during this time as "a limited attorney-client relationship."" 4 The court

confusion); Burrell,176 F.R.D. at 245 (stating that there was "no evidence" showing that
the defendant's announcements, e-mails or meetings were "misleading, coercive, or an
improper attempt to undermine Rule 23 by encouraging putative class members not to
join the suit").
349. See supra note 3.

350. Great Rivers Coop. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 59 F.3d 764,766 (8th Cir. 1995)
(citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 30.24, at 232 (1985)).

351. Inclass actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3), a court must give class members
the option to exclude themselves from the litigation. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2). Class
members typically are given this option in actions certified under other rules as well. See
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 79, § 30.23, at 231 (stating that class

members "may be given this option in other types of class actions"). A class member's
decision to be excluded from the litigation is referred to as "opting out," and the time that
a court gives class members to do that is known as the "opt out" period. Class members
should be afforded a reasonable time (usually thirty to sixty days from a specified date)
to exercise their option. Id.
352. In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 162 F.R.D. 559, 561 n.3 (D. Minn. 1995).
353. 629 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
354. Id. at 1483.
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in In re Chicago Flood Litigation.5 expressed the view that class counsel do not
"fullyrepresent all class members" until after a court has certified the class and
the opt out period has expired. 56 Still other courts appear to have simply thrown
up their hands, saying that before the opt out period expires "the status of
in relation to the class members cannot be stated with
plaintiffs' counsel
7
precision."

It is wrong to say that the attorney-client relationship between class counsel
and putative class members during the time between certification and the
expiration of the opt out period is less than "full," for such a description is not
materially different from the timeless analogy to a woman being "a little
pregnant." The description of the relationship between certification and opt out
as being a "potential attorney-client relationship" is similarly flawed. Either
class counsel share an attorney-client relationship with absent class members
during this time or they do not. If they do, then a class member who opts out is
simply terminating his attorney-client relationship with class counsel, as is
always his right.3a 1 If they do not share an attorney-client relationship during this
period, then assuming that they do not attempt to coerce or mislead class
members, defense counsel ought to be able to unilaterally communicate with
them without running afoul of Rule 4.2 or DR 7-104(A)(1). a59
But the courts that question the relationship between class counsel and
putative class members during the time between certification and expiration of
the opt out period are on to something. An attorney-client relationship ought to
be a voluntary, consensual relationship.3a6 Before the opt out period expires, any
attorney-client relationship between class counsel and unnamed class members
is almost exclusively class counsel's doing, albeit with some help from the court
in the form of the certification order. This is not acceptable. 36 Competent adults

App. Ct. 1997).
355. 682 N.E.2d 421 (Ill.
356. Id. at 426 (emphasis added); see also Potash, 162 F.R.D. at 561 n.3 (agreeing
that class counsel do not fully represent putative class members prior to expiration of the
deadline for opting out).
357. Impervious Paint Indus., Inc. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720,722 (W.D. Ky.
1981).
358. See Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Mo. 1982)
(recognizing the "modem rule" that a client may "discharge his attorney, with or without
cause, at any time").
359. But see Impervious Paint,508 F. Supp. at 722-23 (stating that while before
the close of the opt out period "the status of plaintiffs' counsel in relation to the class
members cannot be stated with precision," defense counsel must treat class members as
being represented by counsel for DR 7-104 purposes).
360. See Chicago FloodLitig.,682 N.E.2d at 425 ("The attorney-client relationship
is a voluntary, contractual relationship that requires the consent of both the attorney and
client.").
361. See id. (stating that an attorney-client relationship "cannot be created by an
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ought not have attorney-client relationships foisted upon them. Class members
are not incompetent wards of the court who require appointed counsel, yet that
is exactly how they are treated when a court's decision to certify a class is
deemed to create an attorney-client relationship between class counsel and the
unnamed members of the class.
Class certification alone should not be deemed to create an attorney-client
relationship between class counsel and unnamed class members. Rather, an
attorney-client relationship should be recognized only upon the expiration of the
opt out period following certification. Waiting until the time for opting out has
expired to declare that class counsel represent unnamed class members supports
the attorney-client relationship by restoring it to a voluntary and consensual
arrangement in class actions as in all other civil matters involving competent
clients. Class members who do not opt out by the deadline for doing so
presumably have chosen to pursue litigation as part of the class, and have
likewise chosen to be represented by class counsel. On the other side of the coin,
potential class members who do opt out presumably did not want an attorneyclient relationship with class counsel.
Critics of this approach will surely argue that delaying the recognition of an
attorney-client relationship between class counsel and unnamed class members
until the time for opting out has run will expose putative class members to more
potentially coercive or misleading communications. Freed from the shackles of
Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1) for an additional sixty to ninety days, defense
lawyers will use that time to undermine the purposes of Rule 23 by wrongly
persuading potential class members to opt out and by negotiating unfair
settlements with individual class members. This is, of course, complete
nonsense. Courts always have the ability to step in and prevent or remedy
serious misconduct by defendants or their counsel.362 Defense lawyers who
attempt to mislead, coerce, intimidate or otherwise take advantage of class
members are subject to professional discipline under a variety of ethics rules. 63

attorney alone and generally the duty falls upon a potential client to initiate contact with
the attorney").
362. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 79, § 30.24, at 232 ("Under
the broad supervisory authority granted by Rule 23(d), the court may enter appropriate
orders to regulate communications with members of the class."); see, e.g., Cobell v.
Norton, 212 F.R.D. 14, 17-24 (D.D.C. 2002) (restricting defendants' communications
with class members and referring defense counsel to disciplinary authorities for
communication sent to class members without court's permission that purported to
extinguish class members' right to recovery).
363. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2003) (prohibiting
knowingly false statements of material fact or law to third persons); id. R. 8.4(c) (stating
that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation"); id. R. 8.4(d) (banning conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration ofjustice); MODEL CODE OF PROF'LRESPONSiBiTY DR
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They therefore have every incentive to conduct themselves appropriately.
Finally, under Rule 23(e) any post-certification settlement must be submitted to
the court for review and approval before execution. 64 Defendants and their
counsel who violate Rule 23(e) risk serious sanctions.365
Given the relative dearth of law on class counsels' relationship with
unnamed putative class members, and given that many cases on the subject do
not count as controlling authority, it is reasonable to ask what should the law be.
When should class counsel be held to have an attorney-client relationship with
putative class members? As demonstrated here, class counsel should be found
to have an attorney-client relationship with putative class members only after the
period for opting out of the class action expires.
Of course, the position articulated here-like the majority rule that class
certification creates an attorney-client relationship between class counsel and
unnamed class members-is a default position. That is, it assumes that class
counsel have not in fact established a consensual, contractual attorney-client
relationship with unnamed class members. Although the existence of such
relationships is unlikely in most cases, the possibility always exists and cannot
be totally ignored.366 If class counsel in fact have attorney-client relationships
with potential class members, they should disclose those relationships to defense
counsel so that defense counsel may avoid improper ex parte communications
and the accompanying risk of sanctions and professional discipline.367
VI. CONCLUSION
Class action litigation has proliferated in recent years. Among the issues
that have gained importance in the developing law of class actions is ex parte
communication between counsel and putative class members, and between
parties and putative class members. From lawyers' perspective, the difficulty in

1-102(A)(4) (1969) (prohibiting conduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation"); id. DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting conduct that is "prejudicial to the
administration of justice"); id. DR 7-102(A)(5) (stating that a lawyer shall not
"[k]nowingly make a false statement of law or fact").
364. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (stating that a class action "shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court"); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
supra note 79, § 30.42, at 238-40 (describing and explaining the court's role in
settlement).
365. See, e.g., Blanchard v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 293, 299-300, 30405 (N.D. Ili. 1997) (involving settlement with class representative).
366. See EEOC v. Dana Corp., 202 F. Supp. 2d 827, 830 (N.D. Ind. 2002)
(recognizing this possibility).
367. See id. ("The court strongly urges both parties to communicate with one
another on the issue of which individuals have established an attorney-client relationship
before any [ex parte] communication with these individuals takes place.").
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determining whether they can communicate with potential class members is
chiefly attributable to uncertainty about the existence of an attomey-client
relationship between class counsel and potential class members. Even plaintiffs'
counsel must be concerned about communicating with potential class members
because of the special rules that govern class action litigation.
The majority position is that a court's decision to certify a class creates an
attorney-client relationship between class counsel and putative class members.
Thus, once a class is certified, defense counsel must treat unnamed class
members as represented parties for purposes of Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1).
Whether the majority approach is the correct approach, however, is debatable.
A better approach-and one much more consistent with the long-established
principle that an attorney-client relationship should be a voluntary, consensual
relationship-would be to hold that class counsel and class members do not
share an attorney-client relationship until the period for class members to opt out
of the litigation has expired.
There are many ex parte communications issues in class action litigation.
Even lawyers who think that they understand the professional responsibility
implications of communicating with parties and others can err in the murky arena
that is the modem class action. With luck, this Article will assist lawyers who
must deal with the fact-specific problems and ethical ambiguities that
characterize class actions.
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